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The Intertwined Fates of Affirmative Action and the
Military
Robert Knowles*
This Article explores the deep connections between the crises facing
the military and affirmative action. The military struggles with a sexual
assault epidemic and a related failure to achieve gender and racial
equality, both of which undermine its ability to effectively carry out its
mission.
Affirmative action faces growing skepticism from the
American public and from the courts, which have been gradually
eliminating the ground on which gender- and race-conscious measures
can be constitutionally justified.
In this time of crisis for both, the military and affirmative action need
each other like never before. Affirmative action needs the military to
tell the American public and the courts, once again, the story of how
race- and gender-conscious measures permitted it to endure earlier
crises and emerge as a stronger, highly respected institution. And the
military needs affirmative action because it cannot hope to eliminate the
damaging gender hostility within its ranks unless it uses genderconscious measures to rapidly integrate its leadership—especially by
assigning women to the combat positions from which they were unfairly
excluded.
If the military can once more lead by example, it may persuade a
conservative Court to accept that there is still a place for affirmative
action in American life. But the military must be willing to act and to
use all of the available constitutional arguments in defense of its own
policies, as well as those in civilian institutions. If affirmative action
cannot survive in the military, it probably cannot survive anywhere in
public life. Its fate and that of the military are inextricably intertwined.

* Assistant Professor, Valparaiso University Law School. I must thank Rosalie Levinson,
Christopher Schmidt, Nick Stephanopoulos, Jim Beckman, Rachel VanLandingham, Geneva
Brown, JoEllen Lind, David Herzig, and participants in the Chicago Junior Faculty Workshop
and Valparaiso Law Faculty Workshop for their helpful comments and advice.

1027

KNOWLES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1028

4/30/2014 9:35 AM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 45

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1028
I. A NEW TIME OF TROUBLES FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
THE MILITARY .............................................................................. 1033
II. LESSONS FROM THE MILITARY’S INTEGRATION SUCCESS
STORY: THE STAGES OF INTEGRATION .......................................... 1044
A. Limited, Temporary Participation......................................... 1047
B. The Struggle for Formal, But Limited, Peacetime
Integration ............................................................................. 1049
C. Crisis and Comprehensive Reform ........................................ 1054
D. The Integration Success Story ............................................... 1055
E. The Long Arc of Gender Integration ..................................... 1059
III. CHANGING MILITARY CULTURE: THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
SOLUTION ..................................................................................... 1061
A. Barriers to Gender Diversity................................................. 1065
B. The Importance of Leadership .............................................. 1068
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE
MILITARY ..................................................................................... 1073
A. The Military’s Entitlement to Special Deference and
Weaker Scrutiny ................................................................... 1074
B. Decisions Striking Down Military Affirmative Action
Programs ............................................................................... 1077
C. The Future of Affirmative Action in the Military .................. 1081
CONCLUSION....................................................................................... 1083
INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the United States Department of Defense (“Defense
Department” or “DoD”) abolished rules formally excluding women
from hundreds of thousands of combat roles in the U.S. military. 1
Although these positions will be opened gradually over several years,
the prospect of a truly gender-integrated combat armed forces—seen
only in science fiction2—is moving closer to reality.

1. See Memorandum from Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Leon
Panetta, U.S. Def. Sec’y, to Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts, Acting Under Sec’y of Def. for Pers.,
and Readiness Chiefs of the Military Servs. on Elimination of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat
Definition and Assignment Rule (Jan. 24, 2013), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/WI
SRJointMemo.pdf.
2. See, e.g., JOE HALDEMAN, THE FOREVER WAR (1974); STARSHIP TROOPERS (TriStar
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These combat exclusions were one of the few remaining areas of
formal occupational gender discrimination in American life.3 They also
ran counter to the military’s own self-professed goals, including the
“representation principle”—that the U.S. military should, from top to
bottom, represent “the country it defends.”4 By 2013, women were
formally excluded from only some 230,000 positions in the armed
forces, out of millions. But these roles are key stepping stones for the
top command positions, and female officers’ career prospects have long
been constrained by their exclusion from them.5
Students of American history know, of course, that it is a long road
from formal equality to tangible equality. Military culture, traditions,
and practices remain, in many ways, uniquely and stubbornly
inhospitable to gender equality.6 Even without formal exclusions from
combat roles, women in the military face “not only restricted career
options but also a higher chance of harassment, discrimination, and
sexual violence than in almost any other profession.”7 A long-festering
epidemic of sexual assault in the ranks has captured public attention and
driven efforts at reform from Congress and the Pentagon.8
The hostility women in the military face is an outrage—not only
because it prevents women from accessing the full benefits of military

Pictures 1997).
3. For a thorough discussion of the ways in which American society is still gender segregated,
both formally and informally, see generally David S. Cohen, The Stubborn Persistence of Sex
Segregation, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 51 (2011).
4. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2017, at 4 (2012)
[hereinafter DOD DIVERSITY PLAN] (emphasis omitted), available at http://diversity.defense.gov
/Portals/51/Documents/DoD_Diversity_Strategic_Plan_%20final_as%20of%2019%20Apr%2012
%5B1%5D.pdf.
5. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Fighting Women: The Military, Sex, and Extrajudicial
Constitutional Change, 93 MINN. L. REV. 96, 139–40 (2008); see also Heather S. Ingrum Gipson,
Comment, “The Fight for the Right to Fight”: Equal Protection & the United States Military, 74
UMKC L. REV. 383, 403–04 (2005).
6. See infra Part III.
7. Megan H. MacKenzie, Let Women Fight: Ending the U.S. Military’s Female Combat Ban,
FOREIGN AFF., http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138200/megan-h-mackenzie/let-womenfight (last updated Jan. 23, 2013); see infra Part II.B.
8. The number of reported sexual assaults in the military rose sharply from 2010 to 2012,
although the Pentagon attributed at least some of the increase to greater willingness by victims to
report. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Reports of Sexual Assault Rise Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/07/us/reports-of-military-sexual-assault-rise-sharply
.html; Jennifer Steinhauer, Sexual Assaults in Military Raise Alarm in Washington, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/us/politics/pentagon-study-sees-sharp-rise-insexual-assaults.html?pagewanted=all; see also 1 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON
SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY, FISCAL YEAR 2012 (2013) [hereinafter DOD FY 2012
ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT], available at http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports
/FY12_DoD_SAPRO_Annual_Report_on_Sexual_Assault-VOLUME_ONE.pdf.
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service, but also because it threatens the military’s mission and
reputation. Sexual harassment and assault—particularly when they go
unpunished—sap morale and productivity while undermining unit
cohesion.9 Persistent gender inequality makes it harder for the military
to recruit talented personnel, marks the military as increasingly out of
step with the nation it serves, and limits its ability to relate to those it
must interact with abroad.10 In 2013, the Army Chief of Staff called
gender inequality a “cancer” on the armed forces that would “destroy its
fabric.”11
Moreover, as civilians’ views of gender equality evolve, the
military’s striking failures in that area damage its reputation as a model
of successful integration—which it achieved largely through the use of
affirmative action.12 The military had, like civilian institutions, long
resisted integration. But once it began to integrate, the military
proceeded with urgency and breadth that outstripped most efforts
elsewhere.13
Indeed, because of the military’s integration history and its
institutional prestige, it still offers the most broadly appealing argument
for affirmative action in civilian life.14 It was the military that did the

9. See infra Part I.
10. See infra Part I.
11. Pending Legislation Regarding Sexual Assaults in the Military: Hearing Before The S.
Armed Servs. Comm., 113th Cong. 2 (2013) (statement of General Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of
Staff, U.S. Army), available at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Odierno_
06-04-13.pdf (“Sexual assault and harassment are like a cancer within the force—a cancer that
left untreated will destroy the fabric of our force.”).
12. See infra Part II. In its broadest sense, “affirmative action” can mean any measures that
promote integration and equality but are not constitutionally required. See Jerry Kang &
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1063–64 n.3 (2006) (“[Affirmative action] includes a broad range of
policies and practices that are designed to respond to past discrimination, prevent current
discrimination, and promote certain societal goals such as social stability or improved
pedagogy.”). However, I use the term more narrowly here to refer to policies that are race- or
gender-conscious rather than race- or gender-neutral.
13. See infra Part II.
14. The history of racial integration in the military has been told in e.g., MARTIN BINKIN,
MARK J. EITELBERG, ALVIN J. SCHEXNIDER & MARUM M. SMITH, BLACKS AND THE MILITARY
(1982); JACK D. FONER, BLACKS AND THE MILITARY IN AMERICA 186 (1974); MICHAEL LEE
LANNING, THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN SOLDIER: FROM CRISPUS ATTUCKS TO COLIN POWELL 292
(1997); BERNARD C. NALTY, STRENGTH FOR THE FIGHT: A HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS IN
THE MILITARY (1986); Stephen E. Ambrose, Blacks in the Army in Two World Wars, in THE
MILITARY AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 177, 186 (Stephen E. Ambrose & James A. Barber Jr. eds.,
1972); John Sibley Butler, Affirmative Action in the Military, 523 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 196, 196–97 (1992); Joseph James DeFranco, Blacks and Affirmative Action in the
U.S. Military 16 (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign) (on file with author).
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most to rescue affirmative action in public universities from
constitutional oblivion. In Grutter v. Bollinger,15 the Supreme Court
relied heavily on an amicus brief by officers, senators, and former
secretaries of defense in concluding that diversity was a compelling
rationale for the use of some race-conscious law school admission
policies.16 The amici had recounted the military’s successful use of
race-conscious policies to integrate the armed forces.17
Yet the mortal danger to affirmative action is not over. The Court
has since expressed ever-greater skepticism about race-conscious
measures, even in higher education.18 Lower courts, to a lesser extent,
have cast doubt on the legality of gender-conscious measures as well.19
The survival of affirmative action in public universities—and all public
institutions—may very well hinge on whether the Court’s now-altered
membership still finds the military’s arguments persuasive.
And just as the future of affirmative action depends on the military,
the future of the military depends on its willingness to use affirmative
action aggressively. In short, as this Article explains, the fates of
affirmative action and the military are intertwined.
In Part I of this Article, I discuss the different crises now facing the
military and affirmative action. In Part II, I discuss the lessons from the
military’s past efforts at integration. In particular, I examine the
divergent paths of racial and gender integration. Although the military
used race-conscious policies to achieve greater integration in the
services, an enduring cult of masculinity has made leadership much less
willing to use gender-conscious policies to the same extent. Formally
excluding women from important roles was just the most obvious
example of this divergence. Yet even with respect to race, the military
has fallen short of full integration.20
The current sexual assault crisis has forced the military to confront its
deep discomfort with gender equality.21 As I explain in Part III, the
military must expand its use of gender-conscious measures to shake off
the mistaken belief that its effectiveness depends on preserving the cult

15. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003).
16. See Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 5, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02–241), 2003 WL 1787554 [hereinafter Becton
Brief].
17. See id.; see also supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part I.B.
19. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Gender-Based Affirmative Action and Reverse Gender Bias:
Beyond Gratz, Parents Involved, and Ricci, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 14–15 (2011).
20. See infra notes 222–23 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part II.E.
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of masculinity. It is the military’s own history that points to a solution.
Just as aggressive race-conscious affirmative action enabled the military
to reform itself amid the Vietnam War Era “time of troubles,” today’s
military must expand its affirmative action programs—with a special
emphasis on moving women swiftly into combat and command
positions—so that diversity is reflected in the faces of its personnel, not
just in its policies.22
Moreover, the military must take these measures despite the fact that
it would be swimming against the current of public opinion. The type
of strong affirmative action measures required for full integration of the
military are, to the say the least, controversial.23 Many states have
enacted measures, which the Supreme Court upheld, outlawing race and
gender preferences in public education and employment.24 And even
where affirmative action has survived political efforts to eliminate it, it
still faces increasing hostility from the courts.25
Nonetheless, as I discuss in Part IV, the military’s affirmative action
policies stand on a uniquely solid constitutional footing. Doctrines that
require especially strong deference to military policies could enable
affirmative action to continue in the armed forces even if the courts
were effectively to banish it from every other public institution. More
importantly, as history shows, the same cohesive and hierarchical
military culture that currently stands in the way of full integration can,
once a decision is made to reverse course, make that integration happen
much more quickly than in civilian institutions. But the military must
commit itself to bold and comprehensive steps toward integration and
stand behind its policies when they face legal challenges. The future of
both the military and affirmative action depends upon it.

22. David Maraniss, U.S. Military Struggles to Make Equality Work, WASH. POST, Mar. 6,
1990, at A1.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (California Proposition 209, which prohibits the state
from “discriminat[ing] against, or grant[ing] preferential treatment to, any individual or group on
the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26 (providing that the state
“shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting.”), upheld as constitutional by Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary
v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., No. 12-682, 2014 WL 1577512 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2014).
25. For a discussion of this hostility and possible causes, see generally Bertrall L. Ross II,
Democracy and Renewed Distrust: Equal Protection and the Evolving Judicial Conception of
Politics, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1565, 1570 (2013).

KNOWLES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

Affirmative Action and the Military

4/30/2014 9:35 AM

1033

I. A NEW TIME OF TROUBLES FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE
MILITARY
One of the darkest chapters in the recent history of the U.S. military
was the so-called “time of troubles”—the late 1960s and early 1970s,
when the armed services were facing defeat in Vietnam; riven with
racial strife, poor morale, and fragging incidents; and generally
unpopular with the American public.26 A number of factors—
widespread disillusionment about the purpose and success of the
Vietnam War among the armed services in general, increasing racial
consciousness in American society, and frustration over lack of
opportunity to be promoted—led to a crippling series of racial incidents
in the services.27 In just two years, 1969 and 1971, the Defense
Department recorded over 300 racial incidents, including “race riots” on
military bases, resulting in the deaths of seventy-one American troops.28
In the fall of 1972, operations on two navy aircraft carriers were brought
to a halt by racial unrest.29
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity, James
Render, reported to President Nixon that year that “acute frustration”
and “volatile anger” among black servicemembers were driven in large
part by lack of equal opportunity and local commanders’ failure to
address the problem.30 Others recalling the incidents identified a
complete breakdown in understanding between minority enlisted
servicemembers and the white officers who led them. 31 The shortage of

26. Mario L. Barnes, But Some of (Them) Are Brave: Identity Performance, the Military, and
the Dangers of an Integration Success Story, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 693, 701 (2007).
27. See id. at 748; see also BINKIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 35–38; Kenneth Karst, The
Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 521
(1991) (“Racial tensions ran high during the Vietnam War, especially in the Army, which had few
black officers and was suffering a general decline in discipline and morale.”); Steven Schlossman
et al., Potential Insights from Analogous Situations: Integrating Blacks into the U.S. Military, in
RAND NAT’L DEF. RESEARCH INST., OFF. OF THE SEC’Y OF DEF., SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY: POLICY OPTIONS AND ASSESSMENT 180, 180 (1993)
[hereinafter RAND Sexual Orientation Study], available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam
/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2009/RAND_MR323.pdf (“Between 1968 and 1972, all the
Armed Forces experienced numerous outbreaks of racial hostility and violence in a worldwide
pattern that nearly matched the strife that had existed during World War II.”).
28. NALTY, supra note 14, at 309; see Bryan W. Leach, Race As Mission Critical: The
Occupational Need Rationale in Military Affirmative Action and Beyond, 113 YALE L.J. 1093,
1111 (2004).
29. DeFranco, supra note 14, at 22 (citing Frederich J. Harrod, Integration of the Navy, 15
NAVAL INST. PROCEEDINGS 46 (1979)).
30. Id. (citing RICHARD O. HOPE, RACIAL STRIFE IN THE MILITARY: TOWARD THE
ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION 39 (1979)).
31. NALTY, supra note 14, at 317 (“Violence and even death proved necessary to drive home
the realization that . . . even commanding officers had only the faintest idea what the black man
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black officers deprived many enlisted servicemembers of role models,
undermining morale.32 The frustration and anger were justified.
Studies during the 1970s concluded that, even controlling for test score
differences, black servicemembers were more likely to be assigned to
combat than technical occupations and were promoted more slowly.33
This crisis, which military and civilian leadership anticipated could
become worse in the impending transition to an all-volunteer force,
provoked a substantial response. The Defense Department took steps to
address the communication failures by establishing “equal opportunity
councils” within each major unit to strengthen communication between
officers and enlisted servicemembers.34 It ramped up training in race
relations and established a Defense Race Relations Institute to oversee
the training programs.35
But officials knew these measures would not be enough unless swift
progress could also be made toward fuller racial integration, especially
in the officer corps. So began the military’s use of affirmative action in
earnest, which consisted largely of three components—(1) setting
integration goals and carefully tracking progress toward them; (2) raceconscious admissions policies at service academies and Reserve
Officers’ Training Corps (“ROTC”) programs; and (3) minority
representation on promotion boards. In December 1970, the Defense
Department commanded each service to establish goals and timetables
for increasing utilization of racial minorities in occupations from which
they had been excluded.36 The order warned that officers who failed to
act against discrimination would be relieved of command. For their
part, service academies increased their enrollment of racial minorities

and woman in the service were thinking.”). Lieutenant General Frank Petersen, Jr. described the
“time of troubles” this way:
In Vietnam, racial tensions reached a point where there was an inability to fight . . . .
We were pulling aircraft carriers off line because there was so much internal
fighting . . . . Platoons that were 80 percent minority were being led by lieutenants
from Yale who had never dealt with ghetto blacks.
Maraniss, supra note 22, at A1.
32. See Leach, supra note 28, at 1111 (“The military further surmised that the dearth of black
officers had weakened morale by depriving young black servicemen of role models . . . .”); see
also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY
JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES 57–59 (1972) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY
JUSTICE], reprinted in 13 BLACKS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES: BASIC DOCUMENTS
455, 529–31 (Morris J. MacGregor & Bernard C. Nalty eds., 1977).
33. Butler, supra note 14, at 203 (citing John Sibley Butler, Inequality in the Military, 41 AM.
SOC. REV. 807, 818 (1976)); see also ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 32.
34. DeFranco, supra note 14, at 22; see HOPE, supra note 30, at 39.
35. Butler, supra note 14, at 202.
36. HOPE, supra note 30, at 39; DeFranco, supra note 14, at 22.
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by making race a factor in admissions,37 and ROTC programs and
scholarships were established at historically black colleges.38 The
services began to require “minority representation on all officer
selection boards.”39
These policies established the basic framework for race-conscious
affirmative action in the military that continues today. 40 Such measures
helped the military rebuild its morale and reputation during the 1980s
and, by the time of Gulf War I in 1991, the military was led by a black
general, Joint Chiefs Chairman General Colin Powell, and racial
incidents were unheard of.41
By 2013, however, it became clear that the military was living
through a new and different “time of troubles.” Pervasive gender
discrimination and sexual assault and harassment were not leading to
riots or shutting down aircraft carriers, but they were causing great
damage nonetheless. Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno
testified to Congress that sexual assault and harassment were “like a
cancer within the force—a cancer that left untreated will destroy the
fabric of our force.”42 Indeed, sexual assault undermines effectiveness:
victims’ trust in the military and productivity are damaged, and talented
female recruits are hesitant to join for fear of becoming victims.43
Sexual assault and harassment were publicly recognized as serious
problems for the military beginning with the Tailhook Scandal in 1991,
when ninety service members alleged they were sexually harassed or

37. Becton Brief, supra note 16, at 18–24 (discussing the identity-conscious policies—
including targets and goals—used to ensure opportunities for women and minorities at the service
academies); see id. at 25–27 (discussing the same policies for ROTC programs); see also OFFICE
OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY & SAFETY POLICY, U.S. DEP’T
OF DEF., BLACK AMERICANS IN DEFENSE OF OUR NATION 44 (1985) (“The Department of
Defense Equal Opportunity Program . . . gave commanders authority to deny on-base access to
any organizations . . . that did not practice equal opportunity . . . authorized commanders to
impose sanctions when discriminatory treatment toward military members . . . was proven
because of race, color, ethnic group or national origin.”).
38. FONER, supra note 14, at 240.
39. Id. at 237.
40. See Robert Knowles & Rachel E. VanLandingham, Affirmative Sir! (And Ma’am): The
U.S. Military Needs Affirmative Action Now More Than Ever, NEW REPUBLIC, June 24, 2013,
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113603/affirmative-action-us-military-still-essential.
41. See infra notes 206–08 and accompanying text.
42. Odierno, supra note 11; see U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE
MILITARY 161 (Sept. 2013) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N REPORT], available at
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/09242013_Statutory_Enforcement_Report_Sexual_Assault_in_the_M
ilitary.pdf.
43. See CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 42, at 3; Michael Martinez, Daughters
and Moms Now Consider Rape Before Applying to Military, CNN (June 17, 2013, 6:47 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/16/us/military-recruitment/.
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assaulted during a Las Vegas convention.44 In the years since, recurring
sexual assault scandals—at Aberdeen Proving Ground in 1996;45 at the
Air Force Academy in 2003;46 and at Lackland Air Force Base in
201347—made clear that the military had failed to respond adequately.
Indeed, in 2013, the level of sexual assault and harassment
experienced by both men and women remained high.48 The number of
reported sexual assaults increased from 1700 in calendar year 2004 to
3374 in fiscal year (“FY”) 2012, although this change may have been
due in part to increased reporting.49 In an anonymous survey, 6.1% of
female and 1.2% of male service members indicated that they
experienced some form of sexual assault—as defined by DoD policy—
while on active duty during FY 2012.50 In the same survey, 23% of
women and 4% of men reported experiencing unwanted sexual contact
since enlistment.51 The plight of victims in the military is made worse
by an insular military culture that frowns on disruption: victims who
reported sexual assaults were frequently retaliated against by their
assailants and commanding officers.52
Since the Tailhook Scandal first brought the problem to public
attention, the military—often with prodding from Congress—gradually

44. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., THE TAILHOOK REPORT: THE OFFICIAL INQUIRY
INTO THE EVENTS OF TAILHOOK ‘91 (1993).
45. See Art Pine, Army Reacts Quickly to Sex Harassment Charges, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8,
1996, http://articles.latimes.com/1996-11-08/news/mn-62470_1_sexual-harassment.
46. Cathy Booth Thomas/Tucson, Conduct Unbecoming, TIME, Mar. 6, 2003, http://content.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,428045,00.html.
47. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Air Force Defends Handling of Sex Scandal, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/23/nation/la-na-lackland-hearing-20130124.
48. Because men far outnumber women in the military, more men than women are sexual
assault victims. But the causes of sexual assault against both men and women are rooted in the
same toxic military culture that too often associates sexual aggressiveness with combat
effectiveness. See infra Part III.
49. See 1 DOD FY 2012 ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra note 8, at 58–59. The
number of reports has increased each year, except for a small decrease in 2007 and 2010. Id.
50. DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., 2012 WORKPLACE AND GENDER RELATIONS SURVEY OF
ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS 21–22, 67 (2013) [hereinafter 2012 DOD GENDER RELATIONS
SURVEY], available at http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/research/2012_Workplace_and_Gender_
Relations_Survey_of_Active_Duty_Members-Survey_Note_and_Briefing.pdf. The DoD defines
“sexual assault” as “intentional sexual contact characterized by use of force, threats, intimidation,
or abuse of authority or when the victim does not or cannot consent.” U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.,
DIRECTIVE 6495.01, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE (SAPR) PROGRAM 18 (Jan.
23, 2012, Incorporating Change 1, Apr. 30, 2013) [hereinafter DOD DIRECTIVE 6495.01],
available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/649501p.pdf.
51. 2012 DOD GENDER RELATIONS SURVEY, supra note 50, at 137–38.
52. Id. at 149 (noting that 26% of the 33% of women who reported unwanted sexual contact to
a military authority experienced a combination of professional retaliation, social retaliation,
administrative action, and/or punishments).
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implemented a series of reforms aimed at better tracking, preventing,
and punishing sexual harassment and assault and assisting victims. In
1994, the DoD established a Victim and Witness Assistance Program to
address victims of all crimes.53 In October 2005, the DoD established
the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (“SAPRO”), which,
although it lacked authority to intervene in sexual assault cases or
provide services to victims, “serve[s] as the single point of authority,
accountability, and oversight for the sexual assault prevention and
response [(“SAPR”)] program.”54 Responding to a statutory mandate,
the Pentagon required all new and prospective commanders to attend
SAPR training.55 The bulk of military personnel—including nearly
every member of the Air Force—received “bystander intervention
training,” which encourages those who observe sexual harassment to
intervene safely.56
The Pentagon also created new resources and procedures to protect
victims, especially from retaliation for reporting sexual assaults. Each
military installation by 2013 had a Sexual Assault Response
Coordinator (“SARC”) who, along with a coordinator on the
installation’s Victim Advocates, connects victims with resources and
assists them in the reporting process.57 Beginning in 2005, victims were
granted the right to file “restricted” reports and receive medical care and
other support services without naming the perpetrator or triggering an
investigation.58 In 2011, the Pentagon implemented an expedited
transfer policy permitting victims to request an immediate transfer from
a unit or base and appeal a denial to the first general or flag officer in
the chain of command.59 After initial complaints that expedited transfer

53. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 42, at 17.
54. Id.
55. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 574,
126 Stat. 1632, 1756–57 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1781(a)(2012)). DoD policy provides that
Commanders should meet with the unit’s Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (“SARC”) for
one-on-one training within thirty days of taking command. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION
6495.02, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE (SAPR) PROGRAM PROCEDURES 32
(Mar. 28, 2013), available at http://www.afpc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130416049.pdf.
56. See CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 42, at 12.
57. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 8, at 72.
58. DOD DIRECTIVE 6495.01, supra note 50, at 4.
59. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 42, at 19–20; U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE
TYPE MEMORANDUM 11-063, EXPEDITED TRANSFER OF MILITARY SERVICE MEMBERS WHO
FILE UNRESTRICTED REPORTS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT (Dec. 16, 2011, Incorporating Change 2,
Dec. 7, 2012), available at http://www.afpc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130416-051.pdf
(note: Directive-Type Memorandum 11-063 was incorporated into reissued DoDI 6495.02
published on March 28, 2013).
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requests were frequently refused, Congress required the Pentagon to
track and publish data on such requests.60
Like the Defense Department’s 1970s measures aimed at improving
race relations in the military through better education and
communication, these reforms were badly needed. However, also like
the 1970s measures before them, these reforms could not be enough
because they could not in themselves change the military culture that
fostered an environment hostile to equality. 61 Only real progress toward
integration could change that culture. And meaningful integration, the
military had discovered by the 1970s, was only possible through
affirmative action.
By 2013, however, affirmative action was living through its own
“time of troubles.” The most rigorous forms of affirmative action—
those centered on hard quotas, for example—had never been especially
popular to begin with, and by 1994, a conservative Congress and
Supreme Court were looking on affirmative action in general with
strong suspicion.62 The Court sharply limited the permissible scope of
such programs in City of Richmond v. Croson in 198963 and Adarand
Constructors v. Peña in 1995.64 In Croson, the Court held that
programs providing for numerical racial preferences in the form of setasides for minority businesses violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment when they were not rooted in efforts to
address specific, present discrimination, and narrowly tailored to
address that discrimination.65 Adarand held that this same strict
scrutiny would be applied to federal employment programs. 66 The
doctrinal change brought by these decisions prompted President Clinton

60. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 582,
125 Stat. 1298, 1432 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 673); CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N REPORT, supra note
42, at 20.
61. See supra notes 33–40 and accompanying text.
62. See infra Part IV.B; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.:
The Backlash Against Affirmative Action, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1609 (1990) (“[A] societal backlash
has set in against affirmative action. And the Croson decision suggests that the backlash has
touched the Supreme Court.”). For recent critiques of affirmative action’s effectiveness, see, e.g.,
TANNER COLBY, SOME OF MY BEST FRIENDS ARE BLACK: THE STRANGE CASE OF INTEGRATION
IN AMERICA (2012); RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG & HALLEY POTTER, A BETTER AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION (Oct. 3, 2012), available at http://tcf.org/assets/downloads/tcf-abaa.pdf. For an argument
that “affirmative action” should be defined to include the vast array of benefits that have flowed
to white males through government programs, see generally IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE (2006).
63. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
64. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
65. 488 U.S. at 509–11.
66. 515 U.S. at 237–38.
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to evaluate the federal government’s affirmative action programs and to
respond with his “mend it, don’t end it,” approach.67
By the time the Supreme Court again addressed affirmative action in
2003—this time in public education—with Grutter v. Bollinger68 and
Gratz v. Bollinger,69 many observers predicted the end of affirmative
action. As it turned out, they were wrong—thanks largely to the
influence of the military.
In these cases, plaintiffs were denied admission to the University
of Michigan—in Grutter to the law school, and in Gratz to the
undergraduate school.70 In both cases, the Court concluded that the
university, through its affirmative action policies in admissions
programs, had established racial classifications requiring strict
scrutiny.71 However, the Court reached different conclusions in each
case about whether the programs were narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest. In Gratz, the Court declared unconstitutional
the undergraduate school’s allocation of additional points to racial
minorities in the admissions process.72 In contrast, the Grutter Court
upheld the law school’s admissions policy, which differed from the
undergraduate policy because it did not assign points based on race, but
instead used race as one “individualized” factor among many.73
In upholding the law school policy, the Court recognized that the
state had a “compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits
that flow from a diverse student body,” which the policy was narrowly
tailored to achieve through the admission of a “critical mass” of
minority students.74 The Court deferred to a significant degree to the
educational expertise of the law school. The level of diversity sought
through the admissions policy, the Court agreed, was important for
developing “cross-racial understanding,” breaking down stereotypes,

67. Barnes, supra note 26, at 748; see infra notes 117–18 and accompanying text. For a
thorough discussion of affirmative action and an explication of the “mend it, don’t end it”
approach, see generally CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION, RACE, AND AMERICAN VALUES (1999).
68. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
69. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
70. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244.
71. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (“We have held that all racial classifications imposed by
government must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”); see also Gratz, 539
U.S. at 270 (“To withstand our strict scrutiny analysis, respondents must demonstrate that the
University’s use of race in its current admissions program employs ‘narrowly tailored measures
that further compelling governmental interests.’” (citation omitted)).
72. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275.
73. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
74. Id. at 328, 334.

KNOWLES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1040

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/30/2014 9:35 AM

[Vol. 45

and for making classroom discussion livelier, more entertaining, and
more enlightening.75 Diversity also played a crucial role in preparing
students to be professionals in “an increasingly diverse workforce and
society.”76
The military’s use of affirmative action played a starring role in the
Court’s decision to recognize diversity as a compelling state interest in
Grutter. A consolidated amicus brief filed by officers, senators, and
former defense secretaries offered historical analysis and data to tell the
story of the military’s successful integration through the careful use of
affirmative action.77 The amici warned that these accomplishments
would not have been possible, and could be threatened, if the military
were not able to rely on some limited race-conscious policies.78 Legal
scholars called the brief a “showstopper”79 that was “delivered, like a
precision-guided munition” in a post 9/11, wartime environment
“certain to maximize its effect.”80
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, drew heavily from the
consolidated brief: “[H]igh-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders
of the United States military assert that, ‘[b]ased on [their] decades of
experience,’ a ‘highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is
essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principle mission to
provide national security.”81 The majority agreed that, because the
service academies and ROTC programs were important sources for
filling the officer corps, “limited race-conscious recruiting and
admissions policies” were necessary in those contexts.82 The majority
also agreed with amici that other elite professions, including the legal
profession, must prioritize diversity for similar reasons. “It requires
only a small step from this analysis,” Justice O’Connor wrote, “to
conclude that our country’s other most selective institutions must

75. Id. at 330.
76. Id.
77. See Becton Brief, supra note 16, at 5.
78. Id. The military’s gender-conscious policies were not much discussed, in part because the
university was not using race in the same way as gender in its admissions policies, but also
perhaps because the military had fallen well short with respect to gender integration.
79. James M. O’Neill, Supreme Court Experts Say Affirmative Action Looks Safe, Justices
Focus on Military Briefs, COLUM. CHRON., Apr. 14, 2003, http://digitalcommons.colum.edu/cadc
_chronicle/567/ (quoting Columbia Law Professor Samuel Issacharoff who called the military
brief “a showstopper” that “impressed on the court the significance not only of the legal
principles at stake but the broader social impact of a poorly thought-out decision”).
80. Thomas H. Lee, University Dons and Warrior Chieftains: Two Concepts of Diversity, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 2301, 2313 (2004).
81. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306, 331 (quoting Becton Brief, supra note 16, at 27).
82. Id.
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remain both diverse and selective.”83
For evaluating the effectiveness of the military’s argument and its
institutional clout with the Court, it is particularly telling that the
dissenters in Grutter, despite their sharp disagreement with the majority
about diversity as a compelling state interest and the use of raceconscious admissions policies to further it—had nothing to say, either in
oral argument or in their opinions, about the military’s affirmative
action programs.84
Nonetheless, Grutter was an outlier in a decades-long trend by the
Court in steadily narrowing the ground upon which race-conscious
measures could be justified under either the Equal Protection Clauses or
Title VII.85 Concurrently with Grutter that Court had, after all,
invalidated the University of Michigan’s policy of awarding additional
points to racial minorities in calculating undergraduate admissions
scores.86 In 2007, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1,87 the Court struck down two school districts’
race-based enrollment targets for student assignments, holding that they
failed strict scrutiny because the districts’ professed interest was not a
compelling one and, in any event, their plans were not narrowly tailored
to serve that interest.88 The majority specifically limited the basis for
Grutter’s diversity rationale to the context of higher education.89 Two
years later, in Ricci v. DeStefano,90 the Court held that New Haven,
Connecticut’s decision to ignore the results of firefighter promotion test
constituted prohibited reverse discrimination under Title VII. 91 The
city’s concern that using the test would exclude almost all minority
candidates and subject it to disparate impact liability was not sufficient,
the Court held, to justify race-conscious measures.92
These decisions, like Adarand and Croson before them, further

83. Id.
84. Leach, supra note 28, at 1141; see Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, 19–22, Grutter, 539
U.S. 244 (No. 02-241), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/02-241.pdf.
85. See generally Levinson, supra note 19.
86. 539 U.S. 244, 244, 275 (2003).
87. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
88. Id. at 726, 732.
89. Id. at 724–25. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that “[a]
compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation,” and that school districts should continue
“the important work of bringing together students of different racial, ethnic, and economic
backgrounds.” Id. at 797–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
90. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
91. Id. at 562–64.
92. Id.
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marked the dominance of the “anticlassification” paradigm of the Equal
Protection Clauses93—the principle that “the Government must treat
citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious,
sexual or national class.”94 Chief Justice Roberts most memorably
expressed the strong version of this principle when he declared that “the
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating
on the basis of race.”95 It is a view that is, obviously, quite hostile to
race-conscious forms of affirmative action.96
Moreover, the Court had cautioned in Grutter itself that a narrowly
tailored use of race-conscious admissions criteria to achieve diversity
must have a limited lifespan.97 In the majority opinion, Justice
O’Connor took “the Law School at its word” that it was searching for “a
race-neutral admissions formula” that would achieve the same goals and
would “terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as
practicable.”98 Given the increase in minority applicants with high
grades and test scores over the previous decades, the Court expected
that, by 2028, the use of racial preferences would “no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today.”99
The dissent mocked the majority for this prediction and, just ten years
after Grutter, the Court again agreed to address the use of raceconscious admissions policies in state higher education in Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin.100 Sensing possible defeat, the military
again rose to the defense of affirmative action through a consolidated
amicus brief making virtually the same arguments it had made with so
much success in Grutter.101 With Justice O’Connor by then replaced by
the more-conservative Justice Samuel Alito, there was some doubt as to
whether the core holding of Grutter would be preserved. But it was.
The Court did not revisit Grutter’s holding that colleges’ and
93. See Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1689, 1711 (2005); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003); Levinson, supra
note 19, at 36.
94. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 730 (plurality opinion) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 911 (1995)).
95. Id. at 748.
96. The anti-classification paradigm is also, on its face, hostile to benign gender-conscious
policies as well. Because the Court has not addressed such policies recently, however, it is
difficult to determine whether the majority would be as hostile to gender-conscious policies as it
has been recently to race-conscious ones. See infra notes 207–55 and accompanying text.
97. Grutter v. Bollinger, 359 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).
98. Id. at 343.
99. Id.
100. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
101. Brief of LT. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 3578590 [hereinafter Fisher Military Brief].
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universities’ interest in a diverse student body was a compelling one. In
a 7–1 decision, however, the Court reversed and remanded, concluding
that the Fifth Circuit had not applied the correct standard in deciding
whether the use of race was necessary to achieve that compelling
interest.102 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion admonished universities
that they “must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral
alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity. If a
nonracial approach . . . could promote the substantial interest about as
well and at tolerable administrative expense, then the university may not
consider race.”103 The Court softened this requirement a bit by adding
that colleges and universities were not required to exhaust “every
conceivable race neutral alternative” before turning to race-conscious
policies.104
The most critical part of the Court’s opinion, however, concerned the
degree of deference owed to the colleges and universities. And on that
subject, the Court made clear its deep skepticism of affirmative action.
Although the Court would continue to give deference to the university’s
judgment that diversity was necessary to its educational mission, the
university would receive “no deference” on whether its chosen means
were “narrowly tailored to that goal.”105
After Fisher, affirmative action supporters “breathed a huge sigh of
relief that the Court did not change the law.”106 But there was no
mistaking the Court’s “tougher, less sympathetic tone” toward those
programs in Justice Kennedy’s opinion.107 And the Court, in its
skepticism, one could argue, was merely reflecting the views of a
majority of Americans. Although a wide array of public and private
institutions, state governments, and prominent individuals had
expressed their support for affirmative action as amici in Fisher, they
represented elite opinion only. A 2013 Washington Post-ABC News
poll found that 76% of Americans opposed race-conscious admissions
policies in universities.108 As for all affirmative action programs, 45%
supported them, but “the same number said they have gone too far and

102. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2411, 2419.
103. Id. at 2420.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Affects Each of Us: The Supreme Court Term in Review,
16 GREEN BAG 2D 361, 362 (2013).
107. Id. at 364.
108. Scott Clement, Wide Majority Opposes Race-Based College Admissions Programs, PostABC Poll Finds, WASH. POST, June 11, 2013, http://secure.isidewith.com/news/article/widemajority-opposes-race-based-college-admissions-programs-po.
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now discriminate against whites, marking the first time in more than
two decades that supporters did not outnumber opponents.”109
The current troubles facing the military and affirmative action are
quite different, of course. While affirmative action is relatively
unpopular, the military still tops the list of the institutions Americans
hold in high regard.110 But this difference is exactly why the two need
each other. The military is best positioned to sell the American people
and a skeptical Supreme Court on affirmative action by drawing on its
own history, which I discuss in Part II. At the same time, affirmative
action can be used by the military to better address its own crisis
through transforming its culture in a way that helps it accomplish its
missions more effectively. I discuss the need for this transformation in
Part III.
II. LESSONS FROM THE MILITARY’S INTEGRATION SUCCESS STORY: THE
STAGES OF INTEGRATION
Despite its current integration failures, the military does have an
integration success story, and it is a powerful one. The military
transformed itself in a short period of time from a racially segregated
institution hostile to equality to a model of successful integration. This
story is compelling because Americans tend to believe that merit alone
should determine one’s success,111 and it was easy to think that the
military, more than anywhere else, was a place where merit was most
recognized. War surely had the power to strip away prejudices and help
one see the true value of an individual’s contribution.
And this merit-focused narrative is, in part, true. The irony is that the
military’s past integration success, especially with respect to race, owed
a great deal to the same institutional culture that currently inhibits full
gender equality. Tradition and the requirements of maintaining
effective armed forces created a unique military culture insulated from
the rest of American society and prioritizing different values:
cohesiveness and hierarchy have always been much more important in

109. Id.
110. See Public Esteem for Military Still High, PEW RES. RELIGION & PUB. LIFE PROJECT
(July 11, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/07/11/public-esteem-for-military-still-high/ (finding that “Americans continue to hold the military in high regard, with more than three-quarters
of U.S. adults (78%) saying that members of the armed services contribute ‘a lot’ to society’s
well-being”).
111. See FAYE J. CROSBY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS DEAD; LONG LIVE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
27 (2004) (asserting that Americans are heavily “invested in the concepts of merit and individual
reward for merit”).
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military institutions than in civilian ones.112 The military still often
reflected—and even amplified—the racist and sexist values of the times
but, for largely pragmatic reasons, it simultaneously engaged in the
regular practice of utilizing marginalized groups.113 Military service
offered blacks—and later, other racial minorities and, to a much lesser
extent, women—opportunities to gain skills and prestige that were
available to them in few other places. These groups, in turn, leveraged,
with mixed success, their military service opportunities in the effort to
drive broader social change. It was more difficult to deny employment
opportunities to minorities who had shed blood for the nation in battle.
The military had been touted as an integration success story as early
as the post-World War II Era.114 But the story began to take hold in the
early 1990s, after Gulf War I, where a racially harmonious armed
forces, led by a charismatic black general, defeated the enemy easily
and helped ease lingering humiliation from the defeat in Vietnam.115
The early 1990s also happened to be a particularly difficult time for
affirmative action.116 In defending affirmative action as policy,
President Clinton relied heavily on the popularity of the military’s
programs and chose to emphasize its use of preferences in education
and training:
The model used by the military, the army in particular . . . that model
has been especially successful because it emphasizes education and
training, ensuring that it has a wide pool of qualified candidates for
every level of promotion. That approach has given us the most
racially diverse and the best qualified military in history. There are
more opportunities for women and minorities there than ever
before.117

112. See BRUCE FLEMING, BRIDGING THE MILITARY-CIVILIAN DIVIDE: WHAT EACH SIDE
MUST KNOW ABOUT THE OTHER—AND ABOUT ITSELF 37–40 (2010) (observing that the military
prizes self-sacrifice, control, insularity, and loyalty to commanders over self-determination and
openness).
113. Butler, supra note 14, at 197 (“The military has a history of utilizing groups excluded by
the larger society.”).
114. See Karst, supra note 27, at 518–19. Early research on race in the military concluded
that integrated units had more positive attitudes than segregated units. See, e.g., 1 SAMUEL
STOUFFER ET AL., THE AMERICAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT DURING ARMY LIFE 566–80, 597–99
(1949).
115. See Barnes, supra note 26, at 702.
116. The Supreme Court—in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, and Adarand Constructors v.
Peña—imposed strict scrutiny on government affirmative action programs and held that past
government discrimination could not alone justify racial preferences in the employment context.
See Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 218, 220 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 472, 485 (1989). During the 1990s, a Republican Congress
considered, but did not enact, legislation eliminating affirmative action in the federal government.
117. William Clinton, President U.S., Address at the National Archives on Affirmative
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Clinton’s education-centered military “integration success story”118
fit well with American’s desire to believe that success should be tied to
merit and opportunity, rather than quotas or other racial or gender
preferences. This education/merit approach prefigured the strategy
relied upon by defenders of affirmative action several years later, when
the Supreme Court considered whether preferences could lawfully be
used by civilian educational institutions.
This education/merit narrative about the military’s integration
success has a great deal of truth to it, but it is not by any means the
whole story.
Expanding educational opportunities, to be sure,
especially at the service academies and ROTC programs, ultimately
contributed a great deal to the integration successes. But the military’s
affirmative action programs went well beyond education, and they
would not have been nearly as successful if the military had not taken
more comprehensive steps such as tracking minority service members
throughout their careers and setting well-defined integration targets.
In addition, the education-centered narrative left out much of the
painful process that led to greater integration. In American history, with
respect to each excluded group—racial minorities, homosexuals and by
now, only in part, women as well—the struggle for military integration
unfolded in a similar way. In the beginning, the military began to soften
its initial hard line against integration when forced to do so by the
exigencies of war: total exclusions were relaxed or ignored during
wartime but restored in peacetime. At this first phase, minorities could
participate only in segregated roles. At the second phase, the excluded
minorities sought formal integration, but met stiff initial resistance as
the status quo’s defenders made a set of arguments that would be
repeated each time a new excluded group sought greater opportunity to
serve: most prominently, defenders argued that integration would harm
unit cohesion and therefore, combat effectiveness.119 At the third
phase, these objections were eventually overcome when the critics fears
proved baseless and the moral force of the minorities’ arguments—
Actions Programs: Mend it Don’t End it 7 (July 1995), available at http://web.utk.edu/
~mfitzge1/docs/374/MDE1995.pdf (pointing out, as evidence of affirmative action’s success, the
“over fifty generals and admirals who are Hispanic, Asian-, or African-American”); see Barnes,
supra note 26, at 703.
118. See Barnes, supra note 26, at 695 (describing the scholarly and elite consensus about
military affirmative action as the “integration success story,” and observing that it was not
completely accurate).
119. See Richard J. Bailey, Jr., Integration in the Ranks: Explaining the Effects of Social
Pressure and Attitudinal Change on U.S. Military Policy (Aug. 25, 2006) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Georgetown University), available at http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&
metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA460792.
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reinforced with blood—could no longer be ignored. Only after having
proved they could fight effectively alongside non-minorities were the
excluded groups able to persuade the military to make integration
permanent. The fourth, final, but often-overlooked phase of integration
was the effort by minorities to achieve full equality, frustrated by the
entrenchment of oft-unspoken biases. At this phase, the movement
toward full integration only really began when the military, compelled
by crisis, made serious, top-down efforts to reconstitute its ranks.
Understanding the full history of the military’s struggles with
affirmative action is important for addressing its current problems
regarding both race and gender inclusion. The military appears to lack
awareness of the parallels between the past and present times of crisis.
Until its leaders realize that it remains in this last, fourth, phase, of
integration, especially with respect to gender, the military is unlikely to
take the necessary steps to solve the crisis.
A. Limited, Temporary Participation
From the Revolutionary War to the twenty-first century wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, men and women of all races have served in the
United States Armed Forces.120 But the experience of AfricanAmericans, in particular, is representative of the long and painful
struggle minorities would have to wage for equality within the military.
In the beginning, their goal was simply to participate in a meaningful
way: blacks agitated to join the fight in service of their country in
combat roles, rather than merely conducting menial tasks. This demand
was accepted by leadership when the military required the manpower,
but was just as often ignored, particularly in peacetime.121 Once the
doors to regular participation in combat roles were finally thrust open,
blacks faced a tortuous road toward rough parity with whites in rank
and service roles—and indeed, equal respect for their sacrifices.
Until World War II, black servicemembers, when they were
permitted to participate in combat, were almost always organized into
all-black “Jim Crow units” led by white officers.122 As World War II
120. See generally LANNING, supra note 14, at 292 (noting that blacks have served in every
war in American history).
121. See DeFranco, supra note 14, at 16 (“The history of black involvement in the U.S.
military is an inconsistent pattern of exclusion during times of peace, and expedient acceptance
during mobilizations for wars.” (citing FONER, supra note 14, at 186)); see also Leach, supra note
28, at 1110–41 (discussing the history of black military service). See generally NALTY, supra
note 14 (describing the treatment of black soldiers from colonial times through the Vietnam War).
122. DeFranco, supra note 14, at 5; see Butler, supra note 14, at 200 (noting that by the end of
World War I, some blacks had served in integrated units, and fifteen blacks had attained the rank
of general). After that war ended and the size of the armed forces shrank considerably, however,
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and large-scale conscription began, black civil rights organizations saw
an opportunity to advance the struggle for equality and integration
through military service.123 They persuaded President Franklin D.
Roosevelt (“FDR”), who counted on the African-American voting bloc
for re-election in 1940, to expand combat roles for blacks.124 The 1940
conscription bill contained anti-discriminatory language, although it did
not prohibit segregated units.125
That same year, FDR instigated what amounted to the first
affirmative action program for the military, however protean and
ineffectual. The 1940 Selective Training and Service Act was only a
policy statement, but it required (1) that the proportion of blacks in the
military reflect the proportion in the U.S. population; (2) that black units
be established in each service branch; and (3) that blacks be permitted
to attend officer candidate school.126 The proportionality goal, while
merely aspirational, was the first quota system established for the armed
forces. FDR also issued an executive order prohibiting racial
discrimination in hiring by defense contractors, although it appeared to
lack an enforcement mechanism.127
These measures were a start, but they drove only limited change. Of
the roughly 900,000 blacks who served in World War II, almost all
were in segregated units.128 Only 150,000 were in combat units, while
the rest were assigned to support units. A mere 5073 blacks served as
commissioned officers.129 What is worse, in a pattern that would recur
in the following decades, integration was accompanied by violence
against black servicemen.130
Nonetheless, in a pattern that would also recur in the following
decades, war brought pressure for progress toward integration. Near the
war’s end—at the Battle of the Bulge—Eisenhower, seeking greater

blacks suffered the brunt of force reductions and were separated from the military in much greater
numbers than whites.
123. See DeFranco, supra note 14, at 15.
124. See id. at 16.
125. See FONER, supra note 14, at 136; DeFranco, supra note 14, at 15. For a discussion of
the role African-American soldiers played in the military during the World Wars, see Ambrose,
supra note 14; see also BINKIN ET AL., supra note 14.
126. DeFranco, supra note 14, at 16; see BINKIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 18–19.
127. DeFranco, supra note 14, at 74; see FREDERICK C. MOSHER, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PUBLIC SERVICE 78–84 (1982).
128. Butler, supra note 14, at 201.
129. Ambrose, supra note 14, at 186.
130. See RICHARD M. DALFIUME, DESEGREGATION OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES 73–74
(1969) (discussing the killing of a black soldier at Fort Bragg, North Carolina by a white military
police officer); HOPE, supra note 30, at 24–25.
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manpower, approved the use of 100,000 blacks with infantry training
and had them assigned to organized, veteran divisions, integrating them
with white companies in France, Belgium, and Germany.131
Commanders praised the performance of the black soldiers.132 A 1945
Army report concluded that black soldiers performed more effectively
when integrated.133 The argument that segregation was required for
unit cohesion and mission success began slowly to unravel.
B. The Struggle for Formal, But Limited, Peacetime Integration
In 1948, black leaders again pressured a democratic president—this
time Harry Truman, and this time to fully integrate the armed forces.134
Like FDR before him, Truman would rely on support from AfricanAmerican voters for election.135 After frank discussions with AfricanAmerican leaders such as A. Philip Randolph and Rev. Grant Reynolds,
director of the Committee Against Jim Crow in the Military Service and
Training, both of whom threatened to lead a massive campaign of civil
disobedience, Truman took action.136
On July 26, 1948, Truman issued an executive order requiring
“equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed
forces without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin” and that
promotions be based entirely upon merit and fitness. 137 At the same
time, he established the President’s Committee on Equality of
Treatment and Opportunity (the “Fahey Committee”), headed by
Charles H. Fahey, who would oversee implementation of the new policy
by the service secretaries.138
Although Truman’s order allowed for “due regard to the time
required to effectuate the necessary changes without impairing
efficiency or morale,”139 resistance to integration was initially
widespread among the military leadership, which sought to interpret the
order as permitting “separate but equal” units.140 Many high-ranking
military leaders, including General Dwight Eisenhower, warned that
integration would harm military effectiveness by provoking racial

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

DeFranco, supra note 14, at 17.
BINKIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 21.
FONER, supra note 14, at 177; Butler, supra note 14, at 201.
DeFranco, supra note 14, at 18.
Id.
Ambrose, supra note 14, at 190; DeFranco, supra note 14, at 18.
Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948).
DeFranco, supra note 14, at 18; see also BINKIN ET. AL., supra note 14, at 26.
13 Fed. Reg. at 4313.
DeFranco, supra note 14, at 74.
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animus among white servicemembers and undermining morale.141
Similar arguments were made during the 1990s by some military
leaders arguing against permitting gays and lesbians to serve openly.142
However, Truman enjoyed the support of the key civilian leadership,
and some military leaders as well, in his push for desegregation.143
Newly appointed Defense Secretary Louis B. Johnson concluded that
Truman’s order required desegregation, and he ordered the services to
submit integration plans.144 Reluctant military leaders slowly relented
to the principle of desegregation.
Nonetheless, progress was grudging, particularly in the Army, the
service branch where resistance was highest.145 The Army complained
that blacks lacked proper “education required for many of the Army’s
occupational specialties.”146 Apparently sharing the concern that
desegregation proceed gradually, the Fahey Committee suggested the
Army restrain the integration of blacks by adjusting the minimum
qualification score on the General Classification Tests used for
determining admission.147 Using this method, the Army set a goal of
10% black members in each unit.148 The other services were also
permitted to limit the admission of black servicemembers using similar
methods.149

141. See Barnes, supra note 26, at 649 n.3 (describing sources regarding resistance among
military leadership to racial integration). Eisenhower feared that, “by passing a lot of laws to
force someone to like someone, we will get into trouble . . . [because racism is an]
incontrovertible fact.” Id. at 694 n.3; see Peter J. Gomes, Going Back in the Military Closet:
Generals Carried the Day by Harnessing Fears of Change, MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL STAR TRIB.,
June 1, 1993, at 13A (discussing the belief among military leadership that integration would
insult southern whites, who would not accept blacks as equals); see also Karst, supra note 27, at
520–21 (referring to military resistance to Truman’s policy).
142. RAND Sexual Orientation Study, supra note 27, at 235–38.
143. BINKIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 27; Barnes, supra note 26, at 748 n.3; see also Richard
A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1998) (observing that racial
and gender integration in the military depended on civilian initiatives overcoming military
objections); RAND Sexual Orientation Study, supra note 27, at 166–70 (noting that Truman had
the support of important civilian and military personnel, including Secretary of the Navy (and
later Secretary of Defense) James Forrestal; Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest King; the
Deputy Chief of Staff for the Air Force, Lt. Gen. Idwal Edwards; and the Secretary of the Air
Force, Stuart Symington).
144. DeFranco, supra note 14, at 74.
145. Id. at 18–19.
146. Id. at 19. As Mario Barnes recounts, “[i]n March 1949, the Secretary of the Army
testified before Congress that the equality of treatment and opportunity would fail because black
troops were less capable than white troops.” Barnes, supra note 26, at 694 n.3.
147. DeFranco, supra note 14, at 19 (citing MORRIS J. MACGREGOR & BERNARD C. NALTY,
BLACKS IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES: BASIC DOCUMENTS 254 (1981)).
148. Id. (citing MACGREGOR & NALTY, supra note 147, at 254).
149. BINKIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 27; Barnes, supra note 26, at 701.
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Once again, however, military exigencies intervened to force
progress as the United States remained mired in the Korean War and
faced serious personnel shortages. The difficulty of maintaining
segregated units in the face of such shortages had been on Truman’s
mind as he issued the desegregation order in 1948.150 In 1950, the
Fahey Committee recommended full integration as a solution.151 A
1951 study of the limited integration that took place in Korea concluded
that it enhanced effectiveness. It advised that “integration should be
carried out as soon as operational efficiency permits.”152 Similar
studies concluded that integration was more efficient in part because it
gave commanders flexibility to assign available personnel to the units in
which they were needed most without the burden of maintaining
racially segregated units.153 Having seen the practical benefits of
integration, the days were over when the U.S. military would utilize
racial minorities only in wartime and only in segregated units.
Although integration continued to progress slowly, it progressed
nonetheless, and at an earlier time and at a faster pace than in civilian
institutions.154 The Department of Defense officially announced the
abolition of all “Negro units” on October 30, 1954,155 a few months
after the United States Supreme Court declared that segregated schools
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.156
While de facto segregation persisted in many military units for many
more years, the truth remained that the U.S. Armed Forces had begun to

150. See A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 70 (Gerald David Jaynes &
Robin M Williams, Jr. eds, 1989) [hereinafter A COMMON DESTINY]; see also Barnes, supra note
26, at 748; Diane H. Mazur, Why Progressives Lost the War When They Lost the Draft, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 586 (2003) (“The military’s success, relative to the civilian world, in
fostering healthy race relations deserves credit. However, it should also be noted that the military
failed to make a moral commitment to better race relations until the need for minority volunteers
after the end of the draft made racial inclusiveness a functional imperative, not just a moral
imperative.”); RAND Sexual Orientation Study, supra note 27, at 169 (explaining why Korean
War personnel shortages forced the Army to progress toward integration).
151. DeFranco, supra note 14, at 19.
152. See id. at 20 (quoting H.S. MILTON, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., UTILIZATION OF NEGRO
MANPOWER IN THE ARMY: REPORT ORO-R-11, at 562 (1958)).
153. The Air Force concluded that integration improved efficiency because “problems of
procurement, training, and assignment always associated with racially designated units [were]
reduced by an appreciable degree or eliminated entirely.”
MORRIS J. MACGREGOR,
INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES 1940–1965, at 409 (1980).
154. Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228, 1237 (E.D.N.Y 1986) (“Before Brown v. Board of
Education and in the days of Jim Crow segregation, in the early 1950’s, the military instituted
relatively successful integration throughout its ranks. This success helped to support national
integration policies in later years.”).
155. DeFranco, supra note 14, at 20.
156. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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lead civilian institutions in racial integration, both in law and in fact.157
The benefits of integration in the military were reported to the Court
during briefing on the Brown decision, and the existence of these
benefits would continue to strengthen the argument for desegregation in
civilian life.158
The gains were too slow, however.
In the 1950s, Black
servicemembers suffered continued discrimination, not only with
respect to opportunities for positions and promotions within the
military, but in everyday life. They faced the same indignities that their
civilian counterparts did: they were denied access to barber shops,
swimming pools, and officer clubs on bases, and they endured
discrimination in housing and schools.159
The next serious effort to address discrimination came with the
Kennedy administration, which in 1962 formed the President’s
Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces (“the Gesell
Committee”).160 “The Gesell Committee discovered an unbalanced
grade distribution of [B]lacks in the services, segregation (or only token
integration) and exclusionary practices in the National Guard and the
reserves, and racial discrimination on military installations and in
surrounding communities.”161 The Committee “considered and rejected
an early proposal to provide preferential treatment for blacks to achieve
better representation in the leadership ranks.”162 But the problems
revealed by the Committee were taken seriously. In 1963, Defense
Secretary Robert McNamara issued a directive “requiring commanders
to oppose discrimination and promote equal opportunity.”163
The military’s response was modest at first, but the McNamara
directive prompted creation of the military’s first substantial affirmative
action program. Known as “Project 100,000,” it sought to increase
admission of disadvantaged groups into the military by relaxing test
score requirements.164 By 1969, the program had achieved its goal:
100,000 blacks used it to enter the military, although most were

157. See supra notes 111–208 and accompanying text.
158. Research from the late 1940s had concluded that integrated units had more positive
attitudes than segregated units. See 1 STOUFFER ET AL., supra note 114, at 587–95. This research
was brought to the Court’s attention in the briefing in Brown. See Butler, supra note 14, at 198.
159. FONER, supra note 14, at 195; DeFranco, supra note 14, at 20.
160. BINKIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 31–32; DeFranco, supra note 14, at 20–21.
161. Barnes, supra note 26, at 701 n.33 (alteration in original) (citing BINKIN ET AL., supra
note 14, at 31–32).
162. Leach, supra note 28, at 1111 n.89; see MACGREGOR, supra note 153, at 428.
163. DeFranco, supra note 14, at 21; see FONER, supra note 14, at 202.
164. DeFranco, supra note 14, at 21.
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assigned to “soft skill” positions that demanded little or no formal
training, such as infantry and gun crews.165 This program was only the
beginning, however. As civil rights rose to the forefront of the national
political scene during the 1960s, the profound legal reforms changing
civilian life would also affect military life.
On July 2, 1964, the same day Congress passed the sweeping Civil
Rights Act,166 the Army toughened the enforcement of equal
opportunity mandates through Directive AR 600-21.167 It assigned each
military commander “the responsibility to oppose discriminatory
practice affecting his men and their dependents and to foster equal
opportunity for them, not only in areas under his immediate control, but
also in nearby communities where they may live or gather in off-duty
hours.”168 Placing the burden on unit commanders—the officers lower
in the chain of command—for integration and non-discrimination, while
holding them to account for failures, would, over time, prove the most
effective means of ensuring successful integration of the military.
But the biggest driver of increased representation of minorities—
mainly blacks—during the 1960s was the draft system, which tended to
provide exemptions for the wealthier, the privileged, and the connected.
By contrast, the poorer segments of the population, where racial
minorities were more heavily represented, were much more likely to be
drafted, “to go into combat arms, be sent to Vietnam, and be killed or
wounded.”169 By the end of the decade, African-Americans would
actually be overrepresented in the military, particularly in combat
units.170 This new problem only increased with the effective end of the
draft and the transition to an all-volunteer military between 1973 and
1975.171 From 1971 to 1974, the proportion of blacks “in the enlisted
ranks rose from 14.4 to 19.9% in the Army; from 11.4 to 17.7% in the
Marines; from 12.3 to 13.8% in the Air Force; and from 5.4 to 8.1% in
the Navy.”172 The number of enlisted African-Americans in all services
increased from 11.4 to 14.9%.173 The representation of blacks in the

165. BINKIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 34.
166. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No 88-352, 78 Stat. 1241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
167. Butler, supra note 14, at 202.
168. PETER G. NORDLIE & JOHN W. SHAW, STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING RACE RELATIONS:
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 73 (1987).
169. DeFranco, supra note 14, at 21 (citing BINKIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 32).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 50.
172. Butler, supra note 14, at 203.
173. Id.
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officer ranks, meanwhile, did not even begin to keep pace.174
The overrepresentation of blacks in combat roles presented two key
problems for the military. First, it diminished the effectiveness of the
fighting force by fostering racial tensions. And relatedly, it undermined
the legitimacy—both internal and external—of the military as an
institution.175 The problem was considered so serious that, for a time, it
turned a basic assumption about affirmative action on its head. Some
scholars studying the military during the 1970s and 1980s discussed
ways in which racial imbalance could be addressed through affirmative
action for white middle-class youths!176
C. Crisis and Comprehensive Reform
These problems had become an acute crisis during the Vietnam War
era “time of troubles,” when racial tensions reached a boiling point
throughout the services. The military responded with a set of directives
establishing the basic structure for affirmative action that is largely still
in place in the military today, although these early programs would be
expanded upon and augmented by others. The services did not impose
quotas as such.177 But the cohesive and unified nature of military
culture, and the tools available for enforcing discipline in the ranks,
gave the services tremendous flexibility to meet integration goals that
civilian institutions could not draw upon. The military had another
advantage that its civilian counterparts lacked—ready access to data.
Comprehensive data collection is critical to the success of affirmative
action programs. Because military life is a controlled and scrutinized
life, the services had a powerful ability to monitor their own progress
toward integration and equality. The Defense Equal Opportunity
Management Institute today coordinates diversity training and assists
the forces with tracking minorities throughout their time in the
service—as they are admitted, assigned to occupations and locations,
promoted, or separated.178 This tracking has helped ensure that the

174. See id. at 204 (displaying a 1991 U.S. Department of Defense chart, which shows a
significant discrepancy in the numbers of African-Americans classified as “enlistees” across the
service areas compared to those designated as “officers”).
175. Id. at 203 (quoting Morris Janowitz & Charles C. Moskos, Racial Composition in the AllVolunteer Force, 1 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 109, 123 (1974)).
176. Id. at 204.
177. DeFranco, supra note 14, at 77.
178. Barnes, supra note 26, at 701–02 n.38; see U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 1350.3,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT PROCESS 6–14 (1988), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/135003p.pdf (requiring the services to track
statistics to report to the Annual Military Equal Opportunity Assessment). Congress required the
Secretary of Defense to “carry out an annual survey to measure the state of racial, ethnic, and
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services are held accountable for addressing racial (and later, gender)
imbalances as key decisions are made with respect to each
servicemember.179
Setting goals for increasing the number of minorities serving in
particular occupations slowly began to integrate those positions. Over
time, minorities were far less likely to be assigned only to combat roles.
But even more important for improving race relations in the military—
and therefore, improving the overall morale and effectiveness of the
armed forces—were the services’ programs to increase the number of
minority officers.
The services pursued their own strategies
independently, but gradually tended to converge on similar approaches.
Service academies increased their enrollment of racial minorities by
making race a factor in admissions.180 The Army, and later the other
services, required minority representation on all officer selection
boards.181 The Navy began by setting up ROTC programs at two allblack colleges, and other services soon followed. The Navy also
reached out to potential officer recruits through Project BOOST
(“Broadened Opportunities for Officer Selection and Training”)—a
program designed to prepare minorities for college and a career as
officers.182 This program was the precursor for many others.
D. The Integration Success Story
These and other programs bore significant fruit in a relatively short
period of time. Between 1973 and 1986, blacks grew from 17% to 30%
of the Army’s enlisted force.183 Black officer representation in the
Army, for example, grew from 2.5% in 1973 to 10% in 1986.184 A
significant breakthrough was the appointment in 1977 of Clifford

gender issues and discrimination among members of the Armed Forces serving on active duty.”
10 U.S.C. § 481 (2000). Each service has created its own equal opportunity departments and
programs separate from the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute. See Barnes, supra
note 26, at 702 n.38 (“For instance, the Army initiated the Commission of Officer Diversity and
Advancement (CODA) to study the underrepresentation of black officers. The Navy has formed
the Diversity Directorate within the office of the Chief of Naval Operation, to promulgate the
Navy’s policies on diversity.” (citations omitted)).
179. Id. at 702.
180. See Becton Brief, supra note 16, at 18–24 (discussing the identity-conscious policies—
including targets and goals—used to ensure opportunities for women and minorities at the service
academies); id. at 25–27 (discussing the same policies for ROTC programs); see also OFFICE OF
THE SEC’Y OF DEF., BLACK AMERICANS IN DEFENSE OF OUR NATION 140 (1985).
181. FONER, supra note 14, at 237.
182. Id. at 240.
183. DeFranco, supra note 14, at 32.
184. Id.

KNOWLES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1056

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/30/2014 9:35 AM

[Vol. 45

Alexander, a black general, as Secretary of the Army. 185 By 1986,
blacks made up 19% of total Department of Defense enlisted forces.186
In 1974 there were 850 blacks at the highest enlisted grade of E-9, but
2000 at the same grade by 1986.187 From 1949 to 1986, the percentage
of black officers in all services grew from less than 1% to 6.4%.188
The military’s affirmative action programs were considered to be so
successful that even the Reagan Administration, which was generally
opposed to affirmative action as policy and hostile to such programs in
government at large, ultimately did little to alter the trajectory of
affirmative action in the military during the 1980s. The principle that
the military should be broadly representative of the society it protects,
which had animated the 1970s reforms, did come under fire, at least for
a time, when the new administration took power. Lawrence Korb, who
served as the top personnel official at the Defense Department during
the first Reagan Administration, explicitly rejected the principle.189
Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger formalized a new policy, stating
that equal opportunity goals could be met without preferential
treatment. But even Weinberger did not take away the services’
flexibility to use race as one factor in making personnel decisions, at
least at the unit level.190 In 1986, the services’ affirmative action plans
still reflected the representation principle, and indeed they still do
today.191
In 1988, the Department of Defense reaffirmed the
importance of numerical targets, issuing Directive 1350.2, which
required each branch to formulate, maintain, and review affirmative

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id.
OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF DEF., supra note 180, at 49.
DeFranco, supra note 14, at 32.
Id. at 89 (citing MARTIN BINKIN, AMERICA’S VOLUNTEER MILITARY: PROGRESS AND
PROSPECTS 55 (1984)). Korb was later a proponent of lifting the ban on women in combat roles.
See SHEILA NATARAJ KIRBY & HARRY J. THIE, ENLISTED PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 96 (1996) (“A number of studies of the effects of women in the
services have found no conclusive evidence that a high percentage of women reduces readiness.”
(quoting Lawrence Korb) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
190. DeFranco, supra note 14, at 96–97 (observing that, even under the Reagan
Administration, each service drafts their affirmative action plan according to their individual
needs and the desires of the service heads, with little pressure or guidance from DoD). If the
services wanted to give the race of a servicemember considerable weight, they were permitted to
do so. See id. (citing the U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5354.3A, NAVY
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLAN 5 (Nov. 4, 1985)).
191. See Rebekah Blowers, CNO Issues Navy’s Diversity Policy, AM.’S NAVY (Mar. 3, 2008),
www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=35401 (“Most importantly, the Navy must reflect the
face of the nation. When the nation looks at its Navy, it should see itself reflected back.” (quoting
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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action plans with “established objectives and milestones.”192
Indeed, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, the military’s affirmative
action programs were widely praised and held up as a model for
successful integration of civilian institutions at all levels. A 1986 study
concluded that the military was “probably the most progressive
employer of blacks in the nation,” and that “[t]wo decades of equal
opportunity initiatives have transformed this once segregated institution
into an organization that employs more black executives than any other
employer in the nation.”193
Scholars praised the military as
“contradict[ing] the prevailing race paradigm”;194 “unmatched in its
level of racial integration”;195 and standing out, “even among
governmental agencies, as an organization in which blacks often do
better than their white counterparts.”196 Professor Kenneth Karst
articulated what is still the conventional wisdom this way: “No one
today claims the services are free from the effects of racism, but on this
score it is hard to find any other institution in American society that has
done better.”197
Military sociologist Charles Moskos observed that visitors to military
installations will witness racial integration and racial equality that are
rarely encountered elsewhere. Whites are routinely commanded by
black superiors, and whites and blacks work together in the performance
of their military duties, rarely displaying racial animosities.198 Moskos
attributed the special success of racial integration to the military’s
unique power to shape behavior through sanctions.199
The military was also seen as offering a signal contribution to
integration in American society at large: it was “the institution offering

192. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 1350.2 § 4.4 (2003), available at http://www.dtic.mil/
whs/directives/corres/pdf/135002.pdf.
193. DeFranco, supra note 14, at 1, 26–27.
194. CHARLES C. MOSKOS & JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ALL THAT WE CAN BE: BLACK
LEADERSHIP AND RACIAL INTEGRATION THE ARMY WAY 1–2 (1996).
195. Id. at 2.
196. Id. at 5–6.
197. Karst, supra note 27, at 521; see Barnes, supra note 26, at 702–03 (describing the
conventional scholarly wisdom). These scholars were quick to add the caveat that the armed
forces were far from perfect. In fact, “in 1991, the United States Commission on Civil Rights . . .
found that discrimination still existed in the Army . . . based on low promotion rates among
blacks and apparent problems in the administration of justice.” LT. COL. ANTHONY D. REYES,
STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR MANAGING DIVERSITY IN THE U.S. ARMY 12 (2006), available at
http://www.deomi.org/DiversityMgmt/documents/DiversityArmy2006.pdf.
198. Charles C. Moskos, Success Story: Blacks in the Military, ATLANTIC ONLINE (May
1986), www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/flashbks/black/moskos.htm [hereinafter Moskos,
Success Story].
199. See id.
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blacks the best vehicle for upward social mobility in our nation.”200
Military service could transform the lives of young African-Americans
“who have been isolated from the mainstream of American life” by
offering a “‘bridging environment,’ in which the individual acquires
new skills and abilities to help him in his civilian career.”201 From the
1970s through the early 1990s at least, the military was clearly ahead of
society at large in offering opportunities for advancement to blacks. In
1985, 95.4% of black men admitted to the Army had high school
diplomas, compared to only 87.6% of whites.202 Moskos noted that
“[t]he Army’s enlisted ranks are the only significant social arena in
which black education levels (though not test scores) surpass those of
whites.”203 A 1982 DoD Military Manpower Task Force study
concluded that sharp increases in African-American participation in the
military was due to a “proud heritage of black service in the military . . .
which has contributed strongly to the prestige of military service in the
black community” and “[t]he fact that military service offers blacks
better opportunities for responsible work at fair compensation than are
available to them in many segments of the private sector.”204
The changing face of the military and the success of racial integration
were visible during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The public saw armed
forces that were much more harmonious and comprehensively diverse
than the troubled and divided military that had fought the Vietnam War.
Blacks made up an even greater share of the armed forces, “28.9 percent
of the Army, 29.9 percent of the Army troops in war theater, and threefifths of some army combat units.”205 But this time, blacks were
represented at all ranks, and were led by four-star general Colin Powell,
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman and “the highest-ranking in a long line of
U.S. black generals.”206 Powell himself had benefitted from affirmative
action in his rapid rise through the ranks.207 Another indication that the
200. DeFranco, supra note 14, at 28.
201. BINKIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 72; Charles C. Moskos, How Do They Do It?: The
Army’s Integration Success Story, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 5, 1991, at 20 [hereinafter Moskos, How
Do They Do It?].
202. DeFranco, supra note 14, at 32.
203. Moskos, Success Story, supra note 198, at 67.
204. MILITARY MANPOWER TASK FORCE: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE STATUS
AND PROSPECTS OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE, at II–13 (1982).
205. Butler, supra note 14, at 203–04.
206. Id. at 204.
207. See Franklin Foer, Quotas and Colin Powell, SLATE (Dec. 14, 1997), http://www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/hey_wait_a_minute/1997/12/quoteas_and_colin_powell.html
(noting that the Secretary of Defense, seeking to increase the number of minorities at top
command levels, had relaxed minimum age requirements to promote Powell to Brigadier
General).
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armed forces had worked hard to address the Vietnam Era racial
problems was the lack of racial incidents during the Persian Gulf
War.208
E. The Long Arc of Gender Integration
While the integration of racial minorities—African-Americans in
particular—was widely considered successful, gender integration
required overcoming greater obstacles and proceeded much more
fitfully.209 Although women had always served in the U.S. Armed
Forces, they were historically excluded from combat roles and largely
excluded from the officer corps as well.210 Still, many of the same
exigencies that drove the military toward rapid racial integration—
personnel shortages, the advent of an all-volunteer force, and the
increasing importance of the representation principle—also drove, to a
lesser extent, gender integration as well.211 The number of women in
the armed forces grew from 1% in 1960 to 10% by the mid-1980s.212

208. Moskos, How Do They Do It?, supra note 201, at 16; see Barnes, supra note 26, at 702
(noting that the services’ racial policies “were so effective that by the time of the first Persian
War, there were no significant racial incidents reported during the conflict”).
209. See Barnes, supra note 26, at 705 (observing that “[t]he story of gender integration has
traveled along a similar but modified arc of inclusion when compared to the story of race”).
210. See id. at 706 n.65. The Women’s Armed Services Integration Act, Pub. L. No. 80-625,
62 Stat. 356 (1948), formally integrated women into the military, but in a very limited sense. See
Valorie K. Vojdik, Beyond Stereotyping in Equal Protection Doctrine: Reframing the Exclusion
of Women from Combat, 57 ALA. L. REV. 303, 325 (2005) (“The Act capped the number of
women in the military to [2%] of all enlisted troops. It barred women from serving on aircraft or
ships engaged in combat missions . . . [it] also barred women from serving in a command
position; women could not hold the rank of general or hold permanent rank above lieutenant
colonel.”). For many years after formal integration, different standards were applied to women
and men in enlistment, discharge, dependency benefits, promotions, and assignment to combat
units. See Lucinda Joy Peach, Gender Ideology in the Ethics of Women in Combat, in IT’S OUR
MILITARY TOO!: WOMEN IN THE U.S. MILITARY 156, 158 (Judith Hicks Stiehm ed., 1996);
Lucinda J. Peach, Women at War: The Ethics of Women in Combat, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y 199, 201–02 (1994) [hereinafter Peach, Women at War: The Ethics of Women in Combat]
(“Legislation permitted the secretaries of the services to discriminate between men and women,
resulting in unequal enlistment and discharge procedures, dependency benefits, and promotion
and combat restrictions.”). The 2% cap was eliminated by An Act To Amend Titles 10, 32, and
37, United States Code, To Remove Restrictions On the Careers of Female Officers in the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and For Other Purposes, Pub. L. 90-130, 81 Stat. 374 (1967).
See Brenda L. Moore, Reflections of Society: The Intersection of Race and Gender in the U.S.
Army in World War II, in BEYOND ZERO 125, 141 (Mary Fainsof Katzenstein & Judith Reppy
eds., 1999).
211. See Vojdik, supra note 210, at 325 (“The history of women in the military reveals the
institutional resistance to integrating women into this powerful male preserve. For women, the
doors have been reluctantly ‘pried open’ largely as a result of the need for more troops during
times of war and following the adoption of an all-volunteer force.”).
212. Butler, supra note 14, at 203.
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Yet in the early twenty-first century, despite the military’s oft-stated
goal of gender equality, the appropriate role for women in the military
remained the subject of controversy.213 The combat exclusions had
made gender integration of the officer ranks far more difficult than
racial integration.214 Congress and the Defense Department had
attempted to ameliorate this disadvantage by permitting women more
time than men to qualify for promotion before separation from the
military.215 But such measures had only a limited effect and could not
begin to compensate for exclusion from combat roles.216
However, as they had in the past, the realities of war seemed once
again poised to force change. From Gulf War I to the twenty-first
century wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite formal limitations on their
service, a rapidly increasing number of women saw combat and earned
medals for their valor.217 The Iraq and Afghanistan Wars were
asymmetrical in nature: the enemy was more likely to avoid the “teeth”
of U.S. defenses and strike relatively less-defended convoys, forward
operating bases, and civilian targets.218 This meant that women, despite
being assigned to “non-combat” or “combat support” roles, more often
found themselves in the thick of the fight.219
In 2013, the Pentagon’s assignment system had not caught up with
this reality. Although in 1994, the Clinton Administration opened up
about 250,000 front line positions to women, and in 2012, a
Congressional Commission recommended lifting the combat exclusion

213. See Barnes, supra note 26, at 705–08 (noting that the role of women in the military was
still controversial in 2007); see also Moskos, How Do They Do It?, supra note 201, at 17
(observing in 1991 that, while, like race, “equal opportunity for women is also a stated
principle . . . the role of women continues to be a rolling source of contention”).
214. Barnes, supra note 26, at 708 (observing that the combat exclusion “sets some formal
limits” on gender integration).
215. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500–03 (1975) (noting that women were
entitled to thirteen years of commissioned service before a mandatory discharge, while men were
discharged once they were passed up for eligible promotion for the second time).
216. See Christina M. Dieckmann, Equal Pay for Equal Work?—The Distributional Effects of
the Assignment Policy for Military Women, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 250, 251 (2001)
(“[N]early two decades after the last statutory bar to women’s participation in combat was
removed, female service members . . . remain barred from positions that involve direct ground
combat . . . .”).
217. See, e.g., Martha McSally, Women in Combat: Is the Current Policy Obsolete?, 14 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1011, 1017 (2007).
218. MARGARET C. HARRELL ET AL., RAND NAT’L DEF. RESEARCH INST., ASSESSING THE
ASSIGNMENT POLICY FOR ARMY WOMEN 139 (2007), available at http://www.rand.org/content
/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG590-1.pdf.
219. See Dieckmann, supra note 216, at 261 (noting that women engaged in transportation
roles in Afghanistan and Iraq have frequently been involved in combat given the dangerous
nature of such regions).
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as a means of increasing diversity in the officer corps,220 the Pentagon
only slowly and reluctantly removed the last formal gender barriers,
opening 14,000 positions in 2012 and the remaining 238,000 positions
by, it is estimated, 2016.221
At the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the U.S.
Military looked much more like the whole of America than it ever had
before. But there was much more still to be done. According to the
statistics from FY 2011, African-Americans were overrepresented in the active duty ranks, especially the enlisted ranks, while Asian
and Hispanic-Americans were underrepresented.222 Women were still
seriously underrepresented, and the Pentagon noted that the number of
women in enlisted ranks had remained fairly static since 2003.223
In 2014, the ability of the military to continue to fully integrate the
armed forces hinged on two factors. The first was its willingness to
take steps necessary to further change military culture, which I discuss
in Part III. The second was whether the unstable legal landscape would
continue to permit affirmative action measures in the military, which I
discuss in Part IV.
III. CHANGING MILITARY CULTURE: THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
SOLUTION
So long as women were denied the ability to fully participate in
combat, full gender equality would remain far out of reach. Yet even as
the last formal segregation disappeared, there was evidence that formal
integration would not lead to de facto integration.224 Women were just
220. See Craig Whitlock, Pentagon to Ease Restrictions on Women in Some Combat Roles,
WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/pentagon-toease-restrictions-on-women-in-some-combat-roles/2012/02/09/gIQAwnL41Q_story.html.
221. Memorandum from Martin E. Dempsey, supra note 1.
222. OFFICE OF THE UNDERSEC’Y OF DEF., PERS., & READINESS, POPULATION
REPRESENTATION IN THE MILITARY SERVICES, FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 18–21 (2011), available at
http://prhome.defense.gov/rfm/MPP/ACCESSION%20POLICY/PopRep2011/summary/Summar
y.pdf. In FY 2011, African-Americans made up 18.4% of enlisted personnel, but only 13% of the
civilian labor force aged eighteen to forty-four. African-Americans were 8.7% of the officer
corps and 8.5% of civilian college graduates aged twenty-one to forty-nine years old. HispanicAmericans and Asian-Americans were 12.3% and 3.8%, respectively, of enlisted personnel—but
18.6% and 5.1%, respectively, of the civilian labor force. In the officer corps, Hispanics and
Asians were 5.5% and 4.1%, respectively, of officers, but 7.3% and 9.2%, respectively, of civilian
college graduates. Those listed as “other race” or “more than one race” were overrepresented in
the enlisted ranks and underrepresented in the officer ranks.
223. Id. at 22.
224. After the combat exclusions were finally lifted, Marine Commandant James Amos
seemed to set the bar so high that it would make full gender inclusion of his service impossible:
the Marines would not assign qualified women to certain infantry roles, he said, until a critical
mass were qualified; and even those women could not serve in those roles unless led by female
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16% of officers.225 The military still had some distance to go in
achieving full racial integration as well.226 And whether gender
integration would even match the level of racial integration depended
on the ability of the military to change its culture, transforming what it
means to be a “warrior” in the twenty-first century.227 This Part
explains why this necessary cultural change can only be fully achieved
through a reconstitution of the ranks—through more deliberate and
aggressive affirmative action.
The military’s integration failures are unjust because they prevent
minorities from taking full advantage of opportunities provided by
military service.
Women and racial minorities unfairly denied
promotions or access to combat positions suffer financially. 228 And
because the military has traditionally been both a ladder into the middle
class and a gateway to leadership roles in civilian life, the military’s
integration failures lead to a dearth of opportunities for minorities
elsewhere as well.
The military’s core purpose is not to provide these opportunities, of
course. Still, as the military itself has begun to realize, integration has
become important for achieving its overarching mission—to serve
America’s national security interests and protect the nation from its
enemies.229 The Defense Department’s 2011 National Military Strategy
made clear that diversity is crucial for achieving this mission: “An allvolunteer force must represent the country it defends. We will
strengthen our commitment to the values of diversity and inclusivity,
and continue to treat each other with dignity and respect. We benefit
officers. See Some Marine Combat Jobs May Remain Closed to Women, U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 29,
2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/01/29/marine-corps-women-combat/187
3753/.
225. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF DEF., 2012 DEMOGRAPHICS PROFILE OF
THE MILITARY COMMUNITY 19 (2012), available at http://www.militaryonesource.mil/12038/
MOS/Reports/2012_Demographics_Report.pdf.
226. See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
227. See Part III; see also MARY F. KATZENSTEIN & JUDITH REPPY, Introduction: Rethinking
Military Culture, in BEYOND ZERO TOLERANCE: DISCRIMINATION IN MILITARY CULTURE 1, 16
(1999) (surveying literature discussing the divergence in the race and gender integration
narratives—but concluding that whether these narratives converge will depend on whether the
“constructed identity of the masculine warrior is open to amendment in response to changes in the
broader society”).
228. See Dieckmann, supra note 216, at 280.
229. See Becton Brief, supra note 16, at 5 (asserting that a “racially diverse officer corps . . .
is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principle [sic] mission to provide national
security”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 1440.1, THE DOD CIVILIAN EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM § 5.2.3 (1987) (describing affirmative action programs
as “essential elements of readiness that are vital to [the] accomplishment of the national security
mission”).
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immensely from the different perspectives, and linguistic and cultural
skills of all Americans.”230
Although this broad statement did not explicitly endorse affirmative
action, it expressed key reasons why affirmative action in the military
could still be necessary, even if it were no longer necessary elsewhere.
First, the long-held imperative that the armed forces look like the
nation as a whole, the representation principle, is crucial for maintaining
the military’s legitimacy, both within its own ranks and in society at
large. The importance of internal legitimacy had been repeatedly
reinforced by events in the military’s history: the Vietnam War Era
“time of troubles” revealed that the military’s mission could be literally
threatened by a large difference between minorities’ representation in
the enlisted ranks and in the officer ranks.231 In a broader sense, the
lack of a critical mass of minority officers sends the signal to minority
enlisted men and women, and the population of potential recruits, that
the military is not a place in which they will be encouraged or permitted
to succeed.232 Lack of sufficient representation also sends the message
to an increasingly diverse American society that the military is an alien
institution out of touch with the nation it serves.233 Such a growing
military-civilian divide would jeopardize the military’s credibility with,
and support from, the public that is crucial for carrying out its
mission.234
Race- and gender-conscious policies may also be especially
necessary for the military because of the strongly hierarchical nature of
military organizations and the critical importance of unit cohesion. Men
and women in the enlisted ranks have much less freedom to exit the
professional relationship than their civilian counterparts, and they
therefore depend on higher-ranking officers to work especially hard at
diffusing tension between enlisted servicemembers and their
superiors.235 Moreover, under the severe duress imposed by combat,
servicemembers “adhere to the group mission with greater intensity
insofar as they feel themselves to be equal and respected members of

230. DOD DIVERSITY PLAN, supra note 4, at 4.
231. See supra Part II.C.
232. Leach, supra note 28, at 1118–19.
233. See DOD DIVERSITY PLAN, supra note 4, at 3 (“[The United States] is a nation whose
demographic makeup parallels the environment in which we live—continually changing—and
DoD must change to maintain and sustain its future forces. To the degree we truly represent our
democracy, we are a stronger, and more relevant force. The Department views diversity as a
strategic imperative.”).
234. See generally FLEMING, supra note 112.
235. Leach, supra note 28, at 1122, 1128.
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the immediate community.”236 While studies show that diverse units
are more effective than homogenous units, officers who share
experiences and backgrounds with enlisted men and women are more
likely to anticipate and resolve potential conflicts and lack of trust
before they undermine unit cohesion.237
The second major way in which diversity furthers the military’s
mission is by strengthening its capacity to relate to the citizens of other
nations with whom the military must work. In 2009, the Defense
Department operated at least 662 foreign sites in thirty-eight foreign
countries.238 Moreover, the U.S. Military is so large that in many
places around the world, U.S. servicemembers become, by default, the
principal representatives of the United States. The importance of
servicemembers’ capacity to relate to foreign citizens continues to grow
as the military’s mission evolves. In an era of asymmetrical warfare
and the battle for “hearts and minds,” relevant knowledge and language
and cultural skills—which a more diverse military can draw upon—are
becoming increasingly critical for its success.239
These are by no means the only reasons why diversity in the military
is important. Diversity furthers values other than military success, some
of which have been recognized as compelling government interests in
other contexts. For the reasons discussed by the Supreme Court in
Grutter, diversity is a compelling government interest for service
academy and ROTC students, no less than for other students, because it
increases the intellectual vibrancy and breadth of one’s education.240

236. Id. at 1122.
237. The importance for the military of having sufficient numbers of minority officers to help
maintain unit cohesion is different from the argument, rejected by the Supreme Court, that raceconscious hiring decisions in education can be justified by the compelling government interest of
providing role models for minority students. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
274–76 (1986) (plurality opinion) (denying that there is a compelling state interest in hiring
minority teachers to serve as role models for minority students); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Sins of Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 86–91
(1986) (situating the Court’s response to the role model argument in Wygant within the context of
its 1980s jurisprudence, which emphasized remedial justifications for affirmative action).
238. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., BASE STRUCTURE REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2010 BASELINE 9 fig.1
(2010), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/BSR2010Baseline.pdf.
239. DOD DIVERSITY PLAN, supra note 4, at 3. During the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars,
female soldiers and marines were deployed in culturally sensitive situations, where their presence
alone could prevent conflict with civilians. See ERIN SOLARO, WOMEN IN THE LINE OF FIRE:
WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 82–83, 119 (2006); see also
Dieckmann, supra note 216, at 261–62 (“[I]t has been observed that the mere presence of female
soldiers [in situations involving cultural sensitivities to women civilians being searched by male
soldiers] often tends to deescalate potential conflicts by reducing tensions and allowing cooler
heads to prevail.”).
240. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328, 334 (2003); see also supra note 16 and
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And to the extent that the military, as an elite institution, helps define
values for the nation, the achievement of positive race relations and
gender and racial equality in the military can influence civilian
institutions for the better.241
In the end, however, the threat gender discrimination poses to
military effectiveness will be the primary motivation for the
comprehensive changes necessary to eliminate it.
A. Barriers to Gender Diversity
The military’s leadership has made clear that it understands the
importance of diversity—and gender equality—in the abstract. And
even before the combat ban was lifted, opinion among military and
civilian leadership, not to mention the public at large, had been moving
toward a consensus that women will continue to play a larger and larger
role in military service more generally—but in combat roles in
particular. Indeed, women had already been serving in combat for years
and receiving medals for their service.242
But military culture, which drives much of day-to-day decisionmaking at the unit level, still remains largely hostile to gender diversity.
Although the end to the formal combat exclusions and reforms to
prevent sexual harassment and assault are themselves forms of
“affirmative action,” the military has not used other forms of affirmative
action aggressively enough to address its failings in that realm.
The biggest stumbling block to realizing the diversity ideal within the
ranks is the lingering importance of masculinity in military culture. In
the terminology of organization theorists, the military has always been,
and still remains, a highly “gendered” institution.243 As Kenneth Karst

accompanying text.
241. For a claim that the military is an institution that defines values for the country, including
values pertaining to race relations, see Mazur, supra note 150, at 563–64.
242. See Dieckmann, supra note 216, at 267 (“As of August 2006, 1,788 women have been
awarded the Combat Action Badge (CAB) for service in Iraq or Afghanistan.”); Hasday, supra
note 5, at 146.
243. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 119; Karin Dunivin, Gender and Perceptions of the Job
Environment in the U.S. Air Force, 15 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 71, 76 (1988); Rebecca K. Lee,
The Organization as a Gendered Entity: A Response to Professor Schultz’s The Sanitized
Workplace, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 609 (2006); Brenda L. Moore, African-American Women
in the Military, 17 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 363, 366 (1991); Peach, Women at War: The Ethics
of Women in Combat, supra note 210, at 201 (citing Patricia Shields, Sex Roles in the Military, in
THE MILITARY: MORE THAN JUST A JOB? 99, 106 (Charles C. Moskos & Frank R. Wood eds.,
1988)); Carrie Peterson, Separation Anxiety and Boot Camp: Why Basic Training Should Remain
Gender-Integrated, 17 LAW & INEQUALITY 139, 141 (1999) (noting that a “general consensus
exists among legal scholars that the military is a “male-oriented institution built on masculine
traditions and practices”); Patricia Shields et al., Women Pilots in Combat: Attitudes of Male and
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has persuasively argued, the deeply held belief that “manhood” and
military effectiveness are interdependent lies at the heart of the
military’s history of excluding minorities—from blacks to homosexuals
to women.244 A racially tinged understanding of manhood originally
motivated the military to exclude racial minorities—who were thought
to possess inferior abilities—from combat roles. Under pressure from
the civil rights movement, civilian leadership, and its own ranks,
military culture shifted, expanding the understanding of manhood to
include straight males of all races.245 Similarly, arguments that
permitting homosexuals to serve openly would undermine unit cohesion
ultimately gave way to acceptance as Congress ended the “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” policy in 2010.246
However, a much more difficult challenge was presented to military
culture by similar efforts to fully integrate women—particularly in
combat roles. A culture that uses masculinity as a benchmark for
prowess and power, and that sees expressing male sexuality as a way of
promoting comradeship, was bound to find gender equality deeply
problematic.247
Sexually explicit conversation has traditionally
permeated military life, from service academy rituals to cadence calls
during training to combat slang and jargon.248 For most of its history,
the U.S. Military explicitly used sexuality to promote espirit de corps
by, among other things, distributing “pin up girls” and organizing visits

Female Pilots, 8 MINERVA: Q. REP. ON WOMEN & MIL. 21, 22 (1990); see also Madeline Morris,
By Force of Arms: Rape, War and Military Culture, 45 DUKE L.J. 651, 708–10 (1996).
244. Karst, supra note 27, at 500–01 (discussing forms of masculinity which cause
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and sexual orientation).
245. Id. at 499.
246. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was a statutorily mandated policy that permitted homosexuals to
serve in the military if they did not reveal their sexual orientation, which the military was, in
theory, not permitted to inquire about. See generally Fred L. Borch III, The History of “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell” in the Army: How We Got to It and Why It Is What It Is, 203 MIL. L. REV. 189
(2010). It was repealed by Congress in 2010. See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2012)).
247. See Lee, supra note 243, at 617 (observing that “male sexuality is widely infused into the
combat culture in military units, as soldiers have long participated in sexual joking and explicit
conversation as a way to forge personal closeness”). The military’s institutional culture operates,
in the manner identified by antisubordination theorists, to subordinate and naturalize an inferior
role for women. See generally CATHERINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE (1989).
248. Lee, supra note 243, at 617; see also LINDA BIRD FRANCKE, GROUND ZERO: THE
GENDER WARS IN THE MILITARY 156–57 (1997); Fred L. Borch III, Military Law and the
Treatment of Women Soldiers: Sexual Harassment and Fraternization in the US Army, in A
SOLDIER AND A WOMAN: SEXUAL INTEGRATION IN THE MILITARY 337, 337 (Gerard J. DeGroot
& Corinna Peniston-Bird eds., 2000); Susanna Trnka, Living a Life of Sex and Danger: Women,
Warfare, and Sex in Military Folk Rhymes, 54 W. FOLKLORE 232 (1995).
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to red light districts near military bases. 249 In general, military customs
are “driven by a group dynamic centered around male perceptions and
sensibilities, male psychology and power, male anxieties and the
affirmation of masculinity.”250
Given the military’s history of promoting gender supremacy, it is not
surprising that sexual harassment and assault are still rampant. Sexual
harassment—against both women and men who are not perceived to
conform to dominant gender stereotypes251—has been used in many
different work contexts outside the military to preserve established
“spheres of male labor by undermining women’s confidence and equal
footing on the job and sabotaging their work performance.”252 The
military sexual assault epidemic—also with both women and men as
victims—is in one sense simply a more extreme manifestation of the
same hostility toward gender equality that tolerates systematic sexual
harassment in the ranks.253 A study by the Department of Veterans
Affairs found that “officers who permitted sexual harassment saw four
times the level of rapes in their units.”254 Another study determined
that 99.7% of female sexual assault victims in the military had
encountered sexual harassment within twelve months of being
assaulted.255

249. See Lee, supra note 243, at 617.
250. Francke, supra note 248, at 152.
251. Sexual harassment and assault by men directed at other men are, like the same actions
directed at women, attempts to subordinate and marginalize the victim by casting him or her in an
inferior role in a gender-driven hierarchy. See Hilary S. Axam & Deborah Zalesne, Simulated
Sodomy and Other Forms of Heterosexual “Horseplay”: Same Sex Sexual Harassment,
Workplace Gender Hierarchies, and the Myth of the Gender Monolith Before and After Oncale,
11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 155, 192 (1999).
252. Lee, supra note 243, at 619; Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107
YALE L.J. 1683 (1998) (arguing for a broader understanding of sex harassment to include
harassing behavior that is nonsexual but nonetheless occurs due to gender hostility in the
workplace).
253. Kim Shayo Buchanan, Our Prisons, Ourselves: Race, Gender and the Rule of Law, 29
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 82 (2010) (observing that “sexual harassment and sexual assault fall
along a continuum and tend to occur together.”); see also Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong
with Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 169, 174 (Catharine A.
MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) (citing John B. Pryor, Janet L. Giedd & Karen B.
Williams, A Social Psychological Model for Predicting Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 69
(1995); John B. Pryor, Sexual Harassment Proclivities in Men, 17 SEX ROLES 269 (1987)).
254. Anne G. Sadler et al., Factors Associated with Women’s Risk of Rape in the Military
Environment, 43 AM. J. INDUS. MED., 262 (2003) (finding that increased rates of reported rape
were associated with environmental factors such as officers allowing others to make demeaning
remarks or gestures about women).
255. Melanie S. Harned et al., Sexual Assault and Other Types of Sexual Harassment by
Workplace Personnel: A Comparison of Antecedents and Consequences, 7 J. OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH PSYCHOL. 174, 180 (2002) (finding that, of military women who had been sexually

KNOWLES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1068

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/30/2014 9:35 AM

[Vol. 45

Moreover, as military leadership itself has recognized, there is a
direct connection between past formal, and current informal, gender
exclusion and the sexual harassment and assault crisis. Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey observed that the ban on women
in combat had “created a two-tiered military culture that fostered
tolerance of sexual harassment and sexual assault.”256 With respect to
the same crisis, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel stated that “[c]reating a
culture free of the scourge of sexual assault requires establishing an
environment where dignity and respect is afforded to all, and where
diversity is celebrated as one of our greatest assets as a force.”257
Because these problems have common roots, they share common
solutions.
B. The Importance of Leadership
In determining what steps to take to address gender inequality and
hostility toward women, the military can learn a great deal from the
literature on gendered organizations.258 In general, studies have shown
that the ability of women to advance and the presence of sexual
harassment hinge on three factors: “women’s organizational power and
status; sex-ratio; and professionalism or sexualization of the work
environment.”259 With respect to all three factors, the military clearly
falls short.
Women lack power and status because they are
underrepresented in leadership positions; they made up just 16% of the
officer corps in FY 2012.260 Just 14% of all armed forces personnel,

assaulted, 99.7% had also been sexually harassed within the last twelve months with the
definition of sexual harassment, consistent with the majority of social science literature on the
topic, being “used throughout [the] article in a behavioral rather than a legal sense”).
256. J.K. Trotter, Highest-Ranking Military Officer Ties Ban on Women to Sexual Assault,
ATLANTIC WIRE (Jan. 24, 2013, 3:55 PM), http://www.thewire.com/politics/2013/01/highestranking-military-officer-says-combat-ban-women-tied-sexual-assault/61386/; see also HELEN
BENEDICT, THE LONELY SOLDIER: THE PRIVATE WAR OF WOMEN SERVING IN IRAQ 227 (2009)
(“Many women believe that such recognition [of their service in combat] will win them more
respect and so reduce sexual violence.”); id. at 4–5, 135–36, 172, 227–29 (describing how women
have, in fact, been serving in combat situations during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan).
257. See Chuck Hagel, Message on Sexual Assault Awareness Month, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Apr.
2, 2013), http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1763.
258. See, e.g., R.W. CONNELL, MASCULINITIES 72–73 (1995) (discussing the way in which
masculinity and gender are produced at the personal level as well as within societal institutions);
Joan Acker, Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations, 4 GENDER &
SOC’Y 139, 145–46 (1990); Dana M. Britton, The Epistemology of the Gendered Organization,
14 GENDER & SOC’Y 418, 423–24 (2000).
259. Myrtle P. Bell & Mary E. McLaughlin, Sexual Harassment and Women’s Advancement:
Issues, Challenges, and Directions, in ADVANCING WOMEN’S CAREERS: RESEARCH AND
PRACTICE 83, 89 (Ronald J. Burke & Debra L. Nelson eds., 2002).
260. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF DEF., 2012 DEMOGRAPHICS PROFILE OF
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and a much lower percentage of combat personnel, were women.261
And the work environment for women in the military in general is still a
highly sexualized one.262
With respect to the military’s sexualized culture, there are positive
signs that the military has begun to understand that it is
counterproductive to attempt to ground unit cohesion in expressions of
male sexuality—at least so overtly. For example, in 2013, Defense
Secretary Chuck Hagel ordered inspections for, and the removal of,
sexually explicit material on military bases. 263 The near-ubiquity of
sexual harassment training is also likely to help reduce the sexually
charged atmosphere by calling attention to some of its
manifestations.264
But these sorts of changes are reactive and a far cry from the types of
reforms the military’s culture needs to see before it is no longer hostile
to gender equality. Such long-dominant institutional norms cannot
change without sustained and comprehensive effort. As with racial
equality, a genuine transformation of the culture requires a fundamental
reconstitution of the ranks.265 This means that the military must move
aggressively to address the other factors—the ratio of men to women in
the military in general and, perhaps more importantly, the number of
women in leadership positions.
To be sure, increasing the proportion of women in leadership roles is
not a panacea. In the literature on gendered organizations, scholars
have observed that women who are promoted to leadership positions
face intense pressure to re-enact and preserve the dominant culture,
rather than resist it.266 In fact, women may be promoted precisely
because they have not “made waves” in their careers by attempting to
change the organization’s culture.267 Tackling sexual harassment may
MILITARY COMMUNITY 19 (2012), available at http://www.militaryonesource.mil/12038
/MOS/Reports/2012_Demographics_Report.pdf.
261. Id.
262. Sara Sorcher, How the Military’s ‘Bro’ Culture Turns Women Into Targets, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 9, 2013, 10:24 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/09/how-the-militar
ys-bro-culture-turns-women-into-targets/279460/.
263. Id.
264. See Bell & McLaughlin, supra note 259, at 90 (referring to a study which found that
women’s lack of awareness about their organization’s sex harassment policy was one of the key
predictors of sex harassment in the workplace).
265. See supra notes 235–37 and accompanying text.
266. Deborah L. Rhode, The Difference “Difference” Makes, in THE DIFFERENCE
“DIFFERENCE” MAKES: WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP 3, 20–23 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2003); see
also Lee, supra note 243, at 659–60.
267. See Rhode, supra note 266, at 24 (“Those who ‘rock the boat’ on women’s issues may
lose the collegial support and career development opportunities that would provide a power base
THE
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be a difficult and lonely task for a female leader without the support of
her male colleagues. Indeed, female officers in the military have been
accused of failing to take sexual assault allegations seriously. 268
On the other hand, this literature also suggests that, when there is a
critical mass of women in leadership roles, an organization’s culture
will begin to change in ways that make sexual harassment less likely to
occur.269 At the very least, female officers are less likely than their
male counterparts to encourage and participate in sexual harassment,
which should mean that moving more women into command positions
will reduce the number of units in which sexual harassment and assault
are likely to be pervasive problems. Perpetrators of sexual violence in
the military are overwhelmingly male and tend to be of at least slightly
higher rank than their victims—a fact that reinforces the importance of
power dynamics to sexual assault.270 It follows that female enlisted
personnel are less likely to face sexual harassment or assault when their
immediate supervisors or commanding officers are also women. Of
course, even female personnel who are commanded by women may still
face sexual violence from their peers or others in the chain of command.
But doubts about the effectiveness of limited gender integration are all
the more reason for the military to move more swiftly toward fuller
gender integration.
Even so, given the slow pace at which women have been promoted
and assigned to combat positions that have been legally available to
them, the meaningful and substantial gender integration necessary to
transform the military’s culture cannot be accomplished without genderconscious policies that give women some advantages in the promotion
and assignment process—especially with respect to the combat roles
from which they traditionally have been excluded. Similarly, more
explicitly race-conscious policies will be necessary to make progress
toward fuller racial integration of the officer corps. For those who
oppose all gender- and race-conscious policies as “reverse sexism and
racism,” such measures would be intolerable, just as the military’s

within their organizations and make their advocacy effective.”).
268. See Knowles & VanLandingham, supra note 40 (discussing the mishandling of a sexual
assault case by Air Force Lt. Gen. Susan Helms, who ignored her senior military attorney’s
advice and overturned the sexual assault conviction of a male subordinate).
269. See Karst, supra note 27, at 538 n.154 (citing to studies suggesting that “the critical mass
of women needed to avoid social problems in mixed groups is about one-quarter”).
270. See 1 DOD FY 2012 ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, supra note 8, at 50-51;
Dep’t of Def., Slide Presentation: Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program, Response
Systems Panel (June 27, 2013), available at http://responsesystemspanel.whs.mil/Public/docs/
meetings/Sub_Committee/20140411_CSS/03b_DoD_SAPRO_Presentation_20130627.pdf.
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current policies are.
But other critics of more aggressive gender-based affirmative action
would also raise different objections—e.g., variations of the original
argument against having women serving in combat—which are
themselves variations of the old arguments against racial integration.271
Rather than arguing against affirmative action on justice terms as unfair
discrimination, these critics object instead on the ground that military
effectiveness will be undermined.272 These objections take two general
forms. First, critics argue, because women are generally inherently less
capable than men at the types of skills necessary for combat, fuller
integration will mean sending women into combat who are
unqualified.273 Second, critics contend, because cohesion in combat
units depends on a peculiar solidarity rooted in masculinity, the
presence of women fighting alongside men will undermine that
solidarity and unit cohesion.274
As others have observed, these objections are based more on
prejudice than fact.275 They do not withstand close scrutiny. Although
some of the fitness standards for combat positions are more difficult for
women to achieve due to natural differences in men’s and women’s
bodies, these standards are generally a poor measure of the qualities that
actually contribute to developing skills necessary for combat.276 As one
271. See Gipson, supra note 5, at 402–03 (providing a comprehensive review of the reasons
historically given for excluding women from combat).
272. See Kingsley R. Brown, Women at War: An Evolutionary Perspective, 49 BUFF. L. REV.
51, 62 (2001) (“[T]here is reason to think that inclusion of women in combat positions may have
negative effects on the cohesion and effectiveness of fighting forces.”).
273. See, e.g., id. (arguing that women may be less likely to possess the aggressive and risktaking personality characteristics of a “warrior”).
274. See, e.g., LORRY M. FENNER & MARIE E. DE YOUNG, WOMEN IN COMBAT: CIVIC DUTY
OR MILITARY LIABILITY? 6–7 (2001) (noting that some critics of gender integration argue that
the presence of a woman’s “sexuality and vulnerability would destroy men’s essential battlefield
bonds”); Brown, supra note 272, at 62 (contending that integration in combat units would have a
negative impact on the cohesiveness of the military and would encourage military service to be
viewed as a mere occupation instead of as a “calling” as it has been traditionally viewed).
275. See, e.g., MacKenzie, supra note 7 (“There are physically fit, tough women who are
suitable for combat, and weak, feeble men who are not.”).
276. See JENNIFER KAVANAGH, RAND CORP., DETERMINANTS OF PRODUCTIVITY FOR
MILITARY PERSONNEL: A REVIEW OF FINDINGS ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF EXPERIENCE,
TRAINING, AND APTITUDE TO MILITARY PERFORMANCE 27 (2005), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR193.pdf.
Lawrence Korb, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and
Logistics under President Reagan, told researchers that:
In my view, women actually increase readiness, since they have more education and
higher aptitudes than their male counterparts. But we hear a lot of anecdotes about
women tending to be absent from duty for medical reasons more frequently than men.
These anecdotes, though, overlook the fact that men are frequently absent for more
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former marine observed, such standards (and the design of much of the
equipment assigned to combat personnel) were “created to measure
male fitness, not job effectiveness.”277 The “unit cohesion” objection is
based on the same fundamental error that critics of racial and sexual
orientation integration have also made—confusing social cohesion with
task cohesion.278 Social cohesion measures the degree to which group
members have affection for one another and socialize together, but task
cohesion measures the degree to which members are devoted to a
common cause.279 It is task cohesion, rather than social cohesion, that
enhances military effectiveness.280 And while social cohesion may be
easier when group members share a common gender, race, or
background, task cohesion actually improves when a group is
diverse.281
However, the most powerful evidence against critics of gender
integration consists simply of the heroism demonstrated by female
servicemembers who have seen combat.282 The more these women’s
stories permeate the public consciousness, the less persuasive the critics
speculative arguments will seem.
In the end, it is diversity, rather than masculinity, that should be the
focus of military culture. In 2010 and 2011, the Department of Defense
sought to reconsider what diversity means for the twenty-first century
military and explore ways in which the armed forces could successfully
“traditional” reasons—being drunk and disorderly, for example . . . .
SHEILA NATARAJ KIRBY & HARRY J. THIE, RAND CORP., ENLISTED PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 96–97 (1996), available at http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2009/MR755.pdf.
277. MacKenzie, supra note 7 (discussing studies of fitness standards).
278. Martha McSally, Women in Combat: Is the Current Policy Obsolete?, 14 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 1011, 1034–35 (2007).
279. Id.
280. See id. (finding that while task cohesion has a “modest but reliable” effect on
performance, social cohesion does not have an independent effect (after controlling for task
cohesion) and that under certain conditions, high social cohesion is actually detrimental to unit
performance).
281. A 2011 study of the impacts of racial integration on combat effectiveness during the
Korean War found that integration “resulted in improvements in cohesion, leadership and
command, fighting spirit, personnel resources and sustainment that increased the combat
effectiveness.” Initial research indicates that mixed-gender units could provide similar benefits.
Leora Rosen, a former senior analyst at the National Institute of Justice, found that when women
were accepted into mixed-gender units, the groups’ effectiveness actually increased. Similarly, a
1993 RAND Corporation paper summarizing research on sexual orientation and the U.S.
military’s personnel policy found that diversity “can enhance the quality of group problemsolving and decision-making, and it broadens the group’s collective array of skills and
knowledge.” Mackenzie, supra note 7.
282. See, e.g., Sarah Boyce, The Girls Come Marching Home: Stories of Women Warriors
Returning from the War in Iraq, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 330, 335 (2011).
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compete with civilian institutions to maintain a diverse pool of talent
that reflects changes in American society. The Military Leadership
Diversity Commission was one organization created to address these
issues. It concluded that the military could only be successful if it
leveraged the differences among its employees in service of its
mission.283 Although changing an entrenched culture will be difficult,
the military has done so in the past, and can do so again. It is,
paradoxically, the bureaucratic, hierarchical nature of the military that
simultaneously frustrates attempts at change while also making rapid
change possible.284 A focus on diversity will help the military take the
necessary measures.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE MILITARY
While the fate of affirmative action in civilian university admissions
is very much in doubt, the military’s programs stand on a different,
more solid, footing. Even if the Court were ultimately to declare all
forms of governmental affirmative action unconstitutional in the civilian
educational setting, it would be difficult to predict from this that the
military, too, would be constitutionally prohibited from using race- and
gender-conscious policies. The military remains a unique institution,
and its uniqueness has long impelled the courts to recognize a set of
special doctrines for the military with their roots in constitutional
interpretation. These doctrines, as well as the special circumstances that
must drive military decision-making, could justify the continued use of
affirmative action in the military, even after it had been banished by the
courts from all other places in American public life.
What is strange, however, is that the military has done a poor job
mounting a legal defense of its own programs and the lower courts have
done a poor job in evaluating them. Although the Supreme Court once
weighed in to uphold a gender-conscious military personnel policy, a
handful of lower court decisions have rejected the military’s use of
affirmative action. In doing so, the lower courts failed to apply properly

283. MILITARY LEADERSHIP DIVERSITY COMM’N, DECISION PAPER #5: DEFINING DIVERSITY
2 (2011), available at www.hsdl.org/?view&did=716014.
284. See Karst, supra note 27, at 523–24; Barbara Reskin, Imagining Work Without
Exclusionary Barriers, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 313, 315 (2002) (noting that “the traditionally
excluded derive their rights and protections from organizational bureaucracies”). On the
bureaucratization of the military, see MORRIS JANOWITZ, Organizing Multiple Goals: War
Making and Arms Control, in THE NEW MILITARY: CHANGING PATTERNS OF ORGANIZATION 11,
17–20 (1964); David R. Segal & Joseph J. Lengermann, Professional and Institutional
Considerations, in COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: COHESION, STRESS, AND THE VOLUNTEER
MILITARY 154, 160–62 (Sam C. Sarkesian ed., 1980).
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either the special deference owed to the military as a unique institution
or the appropriate level of deference for gender-conscious policies.
Even in light of the Court’s increasing skepticism of affirmative action,
the military’s programs should survive legal challenges.
A. The Military’s Entitlement to Special Deference and Weaker
Scrutiny
If the Supreme Court were to adhere to its precedents, genderconscious policies aimed at moving women quickly into combat
positions would be subject only to intermediate, rather than strict,
scrutiny.285 In addition, such policies would be entitled to special
deference that courts have traditionally given to military decisionmaking. This powerful combination should make challenges to genderbased policies especially difficult to challenge. And race-conscious
policies, too, should stand on much firmer footing than their civilian
counterparts.
In the 1970s, the military began attempting to compensate for the
disadvantages women faced from the combat exclusions by giving
women extra time to obtain a promotion before being discharged. In
1975, in Schlesinger v. Ballard, the Supreme Court upheld this
affirmative action policy as constitutional, rejecting a claim by a male
servicemember that it violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.286 As it has with other gender-based classifications, the Court
applied intermediate scrutiny, concluding that the policy was justified
by military necessity.287 The Court recognized that gender integration
in the officer corps was important for maintaining morale and,
therefore, the effectiveness of the military—stating that the policy
“results in a flow of promotions commensurate with the Navy’s current
needs and serves to motivate qualified commissioned officers to so
conduct themselves that they may realistically look forward to higher
levels of command.”288
As in Ballard, courts have long recognized the uniqueness of the
military, and have usually given the military correspondingly unique
deference. This special deference to military procedures and factual
assertions is a subset of the very strong deference that the courts give to
285. See Levinson, supra note 19, at 3 (“[U]nlike race discrimination, gender discrimination,
whether benign or invidious, has never triggered strict scrutiny, but rather, only the less rigorous
intermediate scrutiny test, which requires only that the government prove that the classification is
substantially related to the achievement of an important interest.”).
286. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975).
287. Id.
288. Id.

KNOWLES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

Affirmative Action and the Military

4/30/2014 9:35 AM

1075

the Executive Branch in foreign affairs in general.289 In some cases, the
courts have exercised the most extreme form of deference by declining
to hear, under the political question doctrine, cases implicating use of
the military.290
In other cases involving the assertion of constitutional rights by
military personnel, the courts have addressed the controversies but have
given the military greater latitude than civilian government
institutions.291 For example, in Goldman v. Weinberger,292 the
Supreme Court upheld, against First Amendment challenge, an Air
Force regulation that prohibited an Orthodox Jewish serviceman from
wearing a yarmulke while on duty.293 The Court observed that its
review of military regulations was “far more deferential than
constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian
society,” noting that, “to accomplish its mission the military must foster
instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps.”294
According to the Court, not only are courts “ill-equipped to determine
the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military
authority might have,” but “[j]udicial deference . . . is at its apogee
when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and
support armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is
challenged.”295 In Rostker v. Goldberg,296 the Court rejected an Equal
Protection challenge to the congressional decision barring women from
registration for the selective service.297 In concluding that Congress

289. For a discussion of unique deference by the courts to the Executive in foreign affairs and
why it is driven by certain views of geopolitics, see generally Robert Knowles, American
Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 101–11 (2009).
290. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003 (1979) (holding that the issue of whether
the President may unilaterally withdraw from a treaty, a decision with strong military
implications was “a nonjusticiable political dispute that should be left for resolution by the
Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government”); Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 166 (1803) (establishing the political question doctrine and stating that “the opinion of the
executive is conclusive” on actions of a political nature); Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427,
436 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that the decision to establish a military base on the island of Diego
Garcia was not reviewable); Doe v. Bush, 322 F.3d 109 (1st Cir. 2003) (dismissing a challenge to
the U.S. involvement in Iraq based on ripeness).
291. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 361 (1980) (upholding Air Force limits on the
circulation of political petitions); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976) (upholding limits on
protests and political speeches); Barnes, supra note 26, at 744–45 (discussing cases).
292. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
293. Id. at 509–10.
294. Id. at 507.
295. Id. at 507–08 (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 181, 187 (1962) (other internal citations omitted)).
296. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
297. Id. at 83.
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had satisfied the important governmental objective standard required for
constitutional gender classifications, the Court observed that the
military was an environment “governed by a separate discipline from
that of the civilian”298 and that “‘[C]ongress is permitted to legislate
both with greater breadth and with greater flexibility.’”299
In recognizing special military deference in these and other cases,300
the courts have sent the clear message that they are open to the
argument that affirmative action could still be necessary to the
military’s mission, even if affirmative action no longer qualifies as
sufficiently narrowly tailored in any other context. Relatedly, some
courts have recognized a compelling government interest in taking race
into consideration in job assignments in a handful of civilian
professions, at least in limited circumstances where the needs of the
profession, as with the military, seem truly to demand it.301
A lower court following Ballard should have afforded genderconscious military affirmative action policies especially strong
deference. Special deference to the military, despite some post-9/11
exceptions regarding habeas and military commissions, remains a robust
doctrine. Despite its increasing hostility to race-conscious affirmative
action, the Court has not overruled Ballard or subsequent cases
applying intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny to gender-based
affirmative action programs.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has not evaluated a genderbased affirmative action plan since the 1980s and it has never addressed
the constitutionality of such a program in the employment context.302
Subsequent broad statements from the Court’s majority expressing
skepticism about any form of group classification—gender included—
have emboldened a few lower courts, which have applied strict scrutiny

298. Id. at 71 (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93–94 (1953)).
299. Id. at 66 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)). As discussed above, the Court
had also held that the military was justified in treating men and women differently with respect to
some requirements for promotion. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500, 509–10 (1975);
see also supra notes 286–88 and accompanying text.
300. See, e.g., Miller v. Dep’t of Navy, 476 F.3d 936, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (concluding that
courts should be “unusually deferential” when applying standards of review to military personnel
decisions).
301. See, e.g., Reynolds v. City of Chi., 296 F.3d 524, 530–31 (7th Cir. 2002) (accepting a
police department’s occupational need defense in response to alleged equal protection violations);
see also Leach, supra note 28, at 1095 (observing that, where race- and gender-conscious
practices “have . . . been challenged on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, courts have increasingly
allowed a small number of professions—such as law enforcement and prison administration—to
raise valid occupational need defenses”).
302. See Levinson, supra note 19, at 3.
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to gender-based programs, including some in the military.
B. Decisions Striking Down Military Affirmative Action Programs
Despite the doctrines which should have afforded the military’s
affirmative action programs strong deference—especially to its genderbased policies—even the military did not escape the legal pressure
brought to bear on all affirmative action after the Supreme Court
sharply limited the permissible scope of such programs in Croson303
and Adarand.304 In the wake of these decisions, some scholars studying
the Army’s affirmative action programs predicted that these programs
could not survive strict scrutiny because they were neither aimed at
addressing, nor narrowly tailored to eliminate, present and specific
discrimination in the military. 305 These scholars pointed out that the
Army had not stated with any certainty that the underrepresentation of
minorities in the officer corps was due to present discrimination.306
Moreover, in setting numerical targets for racial minorities and women
in the officer corps, the Army had, some believed, essentially adopted
quotas, which were by that time strongly disfavored by the Supreme
Court.307 And in fact, by the early 2000s, plaintiffs had successfully
challenged in federal court the more aggressive uses of affirmative
action by military promotion boards.308

303. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
304. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). The boldness with which the conservative majority struck down
the affirmative action programs in these cases led to overinterpretation of their holdings by some
lower courts. See, e.g., Peter Lurie, The Law As They Found It: Disentangling Gender-Based
Affirmative Action Programs from Croson, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1563, 1575 (1992) (observing that
“Croson . . . had a mesmeric effect on conservative judges” who “interpreted the opinion to
require the strict scrutiny standard for gender-based preference programs”)
305. Donovan R. Bigelow, Equal but Separate: Can the Army’s Affirmative Action Program
Withstand Judicial Scrutiny After Croson?, 131 MIL. L. REV. 147, 165 (1991); Capt. Holly
O’Grady Cook, Affirmative Action: Should the Army Mend It or End It?, 151 MIL. L. REV. 113,
117 (1996). These studies gave too short shrift, however, to the special deference owed the
military.
306. Bigelow, supra note 305, at 165; Cook, supra note 305, at 117.
307. Bigelow, supra note 305, at 165.
308. See Saunders v. White, 191 F. Supp. 2d 95, 138 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that the written
equal opportunity guidance the U.S. Army provided to its 1996 and 1997 Judge Advocate
General’s (“JAG”) Corps Colonel promotion boards was unconstitutional); see also Berkley v.
United States, 287 F.3d 1076, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (prohibiting the use of racial preferences by
Air Force retirement boards), settlement approved by 59 Fed. Cl. 675 (2004); Christian v. United
States, 46 Fed. Cl. 793, 818 (2000) (prohibiting the use of racial preferences by the Army in
mandatory retirement boards). For further discussion of these cases, see Barnes, supra note 26, at
715–17; see also MILITARY LEADERSHIP DIVERSITY COMM’N, ISSUE PAPER #51: AN OVERVIEW
OF LEGAL CASES CHALLENGING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY GUIDANCE TO CERTAIN MILITARY
PROMOTION AND RETIREMENT BOARDS (2010), available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did
=716204.
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The military itself is partly to blame for these setbacks. Aside from
its highly effective defense of diversity as a compelling interest in
Grutter, the military has made a surprisingly weak effort to defend its
affirmative action programs in court. So far, the military has not
attempted to assert in litigation any rationale for affirmative action other
than two most closely connected to mission effectiveness—unit
cohesion and relating to foreign citizens.309 Often, it has not even made
these arguments. In one case, for example, the Army first insisted that
it had not used racial classifications at all, and then relied on the
argument that the plaintiff would not have been promoted even in the
absence of the affirmative action policy. 310
What is also striking about these cases is the inconsistency and lack
of clarity with which the courts applied the level of scrutiny for genderconscious policies and the special deference to which the military has
been traditionally entitled, particularly in regard to its personnel
policies.
Saunders v. White,311 a district court case, best illustrates the failures
of the courts to apply the correct standards and the failures of the
military to marshal the necessary facts to properly evaluate the
military’s affirmative action policies. A white male retired Judge
Advocate General (“JAG”) officer sued the Army, claiming that he was
discriminated against on the basis of race and gender in violation of the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.312 Specifically, he alleged that
the Promotion Selection Boards denied him promotion to Colonel due
to application of the Army’s equal opportunity policy.313 The policy
documents were ambiguous, but they could be interpreted as urging
promotion boards to aim to approve promotion of specific numbers of
minorities.314 The Army precept instructed JAG Promotion Boards to
“be alert to the possibility of past personal or institutional
discrimination—either intentional or inadvertent—in the assignment
patterns, evaluations, or professional development of officers in those

309. See Fisher Military Brief, supra note 101.
310. See Saunders, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 95.
311. Id.
312. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause incorporates the equal protection principles
and jurisprudence from the Fourteenth Amendment, including those that limit racial and gender
classifications. See Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
313. Saunders, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 98.
314. For further discussion of the Army’s affirmative action policies with respect to officer
promotion prior to Saunders, see Barnes, supra note 26, at 715; Bigelow, supra note 305, at 161–
64; Cook, supra note 305, at 140–45 (observing that the boards’ equal opportunity instructions
were contained in D.A. Memo 600-2).
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groups for which you have an equal opportunity selection goal.”315 The
boards were required to “review and report . . . the extent to which
minority and female officers were selected at a rate less than . . . nonminority officers.”316 The policy specifically denied that it should be
“interpreted as guidance to meet a particular quota,” but in an appendix
to the precept, boards were instructed that the goal was “to achieve a
selection rate in each minority and gender group . . . that is not less than
the selection rate for all officers in the promotion zone.”317
The court concluded that the policy was unconstitutional, rejecting
the Army’s justifications for the policy as required to remedy past
discrimination in the promotion process and “create the perception of
equal treatment.”318 The Saunders court held that, in the Army JAG
Promotion Board context, preferences based on neither gender nor race
were constitutional.319 The court found that the evidence submitted by
the Army had failed to establish the “pervasive, systematic, and
obstinate” discriminatory conduct that would justify the use of some
racial preferences under Adarand.320 Although in Ballard the Supreme
Court upheld gender classifications in the officer promotion context, in
part based on the military’s unique requirements,321 the Saunders court
did not mention or cite to Ballard at all!
Moreover, as a true test of whether the military’s affirmative action
policies were constitutional, Saunders was a problematic case because
the Army manifestly failed to make the strongest possible argument for
its own policies. The evidence it offered for past discrimination was
largely based on a study of twenty years of data regarding black
personnel,322 but this data was ambiguous: it indicated that, during
some periods, black officers had been promoted faster to lower ranks
than white officers and that the differences in promotion rates to senior
ranks had closed rapidly during the last decade studied.323 The court
was also skeptical about the usefulness of the data because it covered
the Army as whole, rather than just the JAG Corps.324 The court’s

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Saunders, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 121.
Id.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id. at 131–32 (citing Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)).
See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975).
The data the Army relied on was contained in JAMES A. THOMAS, RACE RELATIONS
RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE 1970’S: A COLLECTION OF READINGS (1988).
323. Saunders, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 130–31.
324. Id.
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findings were contradicted by later, more comprehensive studies of
promotion data from as recently as 2010 concluding that both racial
minorities and women continued to systematically suffer from poorer
rates of promotion than non-minorities.325
The court also found that the Army had failed to demonstrate that the
plaintiff was not subjected to an unfair process during the two years he
was up for promotion and before the boards.326 Here, the Army’s case
was especially difficult to make: the Army asserted that the plaintiff
would not have been promoted, even in the absence of the equal
opportunity policies, but the records of the promotion board
proceedings had been destroyed, as mandated by Army procedures.327
In two other cases that are noteworthy for their thin analysis, courts
held unconstitutional military affirmative action policies regarding
promotion and retirement very similar to the ones struck down in
Saunders. In Christian v. United States, the U.S. Court of Claims held
that the Army’s policies for Selective Early Retirement Boards
(“SERBs”) violated the Fifth Amendment.328
Like the equal
opportunity policies governing the JAG Promotion Boards addressed in
Saunders, the Army SERBs were directed to consider evidence of past
discrimination and pursue the goal of limiting selection of minority and
female candidates for early retirement to the same rate as non-minority
candidates.329
In Berkley v. United States—the only Court of Appeals case
addressing the military’s use of affirmative action after Ballard—the
Federal Circuit addressed a similar affirmative action policy for Air
Force boards charged with selecting officers for termination after a
Reduction In Force (“RIF”).330 Unlike the boards that were the subject
of Saunders and Christian, the Air Force RIF Boards were not charged
with the goal of limiting minority terminations to a specific proportion
of the whole; the Air Force policy instead instructed the Boards to
consider past discrimination in its decision-making.331 The Federal
325. See MILITARY LEADERSHIP DIVERSITY COMM’N, DECISION PAPER #4: PROMOTION
(2011), available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=716012; Barnes, supra note 26, at 716; see
also RAND Sexual Orientation Study, supra note 27, at 44–45.
326. Saunders, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 111 (regarding the central issue as whether the 1996 and
1997 boards relied on, and were motivated by, race and gender classifications in the decision not
to promote Saunders).
327. Id. at 112–13; see also Barnes, supra note 26, at 715–17 (discussing the arguments made
and the decision reached by the Saunders court).
328. Christian v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 793, 804 (2000).
329. Id.
330. Berkley v. United States, 287 F.3d 1076, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
331. Id. at 1081.
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Circuit held that this alone was sufficient to create racial and gender
classifications subject to strict scrutiny.332 As for special deference to
the military, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that it existed, but
declined to decide “what effect, if any, deference to the military would
have on the judicial application of strict scrutiny.”333
C. The Future of Affirmative Action in the Military
After these reverse-discrimination lawsuits,334 the armed forces
pulled back on the affirmative action mandates for officer-selection
procedures.335 In 2006, for example, the Army’s revised guidance still
required promotion boards to report race and gender statistics, but no
longer contained language instructing boards to consider past
discrimination or stating a particular selection rate for minorities as a
goal.336 In 2011, the Army restored the instruction that boards should
take into account the fact that there had been past institutional
discrimination, but made clear that boards may not grant preferences
based on past discrimination.337 The Navy’s most recent policy
instructed boards that, to select the best officers, they “must ensure that
officers were not disadvantaged by their race, religious preference,
ethnicity, gender, or national origin.”338
With affirmative action temporarily curtailed in the officer-selection
process, the affirmative action measures practiced by the service
academies and ROTC programs became more important for achieving

332. See id. at 1082 (“Because we conclude that the MOI requires differential treatment of
officers based on their race or gender, it must be evaluated under a strict scrutiny analysis.”).
333. Id. at 1091.
334. Other officer selection policies were challenged in court, with similar results in Baker v.
United States, 127 F.3d 1081, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Ricks v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 826, 830
(2005); Alvin v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 295, 297 (2001); Sirmans v. Brownlee, 346 F. Supp.
2d 56, 62 (D.D.C. 2004). From Sirmans:
The instructions, which set numerical goals for promotion of women, violated the Fifth
Amendment right to equal protection because they favored women during both the
initial consideration and the review procedure without connection to an important
government interest as required by intermediate scrutiny. . . . The Army’s sole
argument in the face of Saunders is that Saunders involved a Caucasian, not a minority
like plaintiff. This argument rehashes the Army’s standing argument and fails to
comprehend that plaintiff, as a male, can claim the benefit of Saunders regardless of
his race.
Sirmans, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (citations omitted).
335. See Barnes, supra note 26, at 717.
336. See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR ACTIVE-DUTY LIST OFFICER
SELECTION BOARDS 52 (Sept. 25, 2006), available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf
/m600_2.pdf.
337. See DOD DIVERSITY PLAN, supra note 4, at 3.
338. 2012 DOD GENDER RELATIONS SURVEY, supra note 50, at 137.
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the goal of representation in the officer corps. Because military leaders
are selected from within rather than without, aggressive strategies
toward educational institutions became crucial for achieving the
accession of sufficient numbers of minority and women officers. 339
From the 1970s until at least the early 2000s, the armed services used a
number of race- and gender-conscious policies. To increase the
numbers of minorities eligible for admission to the service academies,
each service (except the Coast Guard) began to rely heavily on their
preparatory schools, which gave strong preferences to minorities in
admission. In 2009, racial minorities comprised nearly 50% of students
at the United States Military Academy and United States Air Force
Academy Preparatory Schools, and more than 50% at the United States
Naval Academy Preparatory School. Fifteen to twenty percent of
students in these preparatory schools were women.340 Junior ROTC
programs for high school students have primarily served minority
students as well: in 2010, the majority of participants were racial
minorities, and 30–45% were women.341
The service academies themselves all worked with some form of
numerical targets for the admission of racial minorities and used race as
a “plus factor” in admissions.342 The ROTC, a second major conduit
for civilians into the officer corps, heavily targeted scholarships to
minority students. In 2001, for example, black applicants were twice as
likely to be awarded Army ROTC scholarships than white applicants
because many such scholarships were earmarked for historically black
colleges.343
Such policies yielded impressive results, particularly in the early
years. In 1968, 110 blacks were admitted to all three service academies,
but in 2004, the same number were enrolled at West Point alone.344
Still, these measures, aggressive as they were, did not enable the
services to reach the military’s goal of the officer corps representing the
diversity of society at large. In 2009, all racial minorities were still
underrepresented in accession from ROTC and service academies.345
339. Leach, supra note 28, at 1113–14.
340. MILITARY LEADERSHIP DIVERSITY COMM’N, ISSUE PAPER #39: SERVICE ACADEMY
PREPARATORY SCHOOLS AS A RESOURCE FOR RACIAL/ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE OFFICER
CORPS (2010), available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=716180.
341. MILITARY LEADERSHIP DIVERSITY COMM’N, DECISION PAPER #1: OUTREACH AND
RECRUITING (2011) [hereinafter M.L.D.C. Decision Paper #1], available at http://www.hsdl.org
/?view&did=715994.
342. Leach, supra note 28, at 1112.
343. Id. at 1113–14.
344. Id.
345. See M.L.D.C. Decision Paper #1, supra note 341.
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Yet without these aggressive measures with respect to education,
Defense Department officials have argued, the officer corps would
rapidly revert to an almost exclusively non-minority one.346
Despite the setbacks suffered by the military’s affirmative action
programs during the 1990s and early 2000s, these programs still
enjoyed widespread respect and support when the Supreme Court once
again addressed the constitutionality of affirmative action programs in
2003—this time in public education—with Grutter.347 In using the
military’s affirmative action programs in education—for admission to
the service academies, preparatory schools, and ROTC Programs—at
the very least as a justification for the use of affirmative action in other
contexts, the Grutter Court seemed to give these programs the highest
stamp of constitutional approval.
Nonetheless, the survival of
affirmative action in the military—and perhaps affirmative action
elsewhere as well—depends on the military’s willingness not only to
use affirmative action more aggressively, but also to defend its own
affirmative action policies the way it has so vigorously defended
affirmative action in general.
CONCLUSION
During a period when the viability of race- and gender-conscious
measures in public institutions was suffering blow after blow, perhaps
the most well-admired public institution of all—the U.S. Military—
stepped in to persuade the U.S. Supreme Court to preserve some
constitutional space for affirmative action. Why did the military draw
on its deep reservoir of public respect to defend an unpopular set of
practices? The military’s own recent history tells the tale. Without
decades of using race-conscious measures in its education, assignment,
and promotion policies, the military could never have achieved the level
of diversity in its ranks that, at least in part, has enabled it to earn the
broad respect it used so effectively in persuading the Court.
Yet even as the military stepped in to rescue affirmative action in
court, it struggled with its own failures to achieve racial and gender
equality. Although the military presented to the public a racially
diverse image, full racial integration of the officer corps, in particular,
remained incomplete. And female servicemembers faced, not only
formal exclusion from combat roles and the potential for advancement
that came with them, but also a slow-boiling sexual assault and
harassment epidemic, which the measures the military has taken so
346. See Becton Brief, supra note 16, at 5, 7, 30.
347. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003).
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far—such as intensive anti-harassment training and new procedures for
dealing with sexual assault cases—have not been enough to stem.
Although the military has emerged as a staunch defender of
affirmative action, its efforts at achieving full equality in its own ranks
have fallen short because it has not used affirmative action aggressively
enough. For one thing, perhaps due to confusing signals from civilian
leadership, the military offered a woefully inadequate legal defense of
its affirmative action policies when some of them were challenged in
lower federal courts. Moreover, a military culture that has long
associated combat effectiveness with masculinity in general, and a
specific vision of male sexuality in particular, remained a stumbling
block to gender integration. Even as more and more women saw
combat, their status as second-class citizens in the military contributed
to an environment in which they were often victims of harassment and
assault. Aside from the fact that the persistence of the problem is an
affront to the military’s own best values, the resulting damage to
productivity, morale, and unit cohesion surely outweighed any purely
speculative benefit that might flow from preserving an antiquated
gender supremacy. Strength through diversity, rather than masculinity,
represents the future of military effectiveness.
As the literature on gendered organizations reveals, the problematic
aspects of military culture can only be fully transformed through a
reconstitution of military leadership. And that sort of reconstitution will
not happen without robust efforts to promote and assign women quickly
to the leadership positions from which, through formal or de facto
norms, they have long been excluded. And to the extent that the officer
corps does not reflect the full racial diversity of the nation it serves, a
renewed effort to promote racial minorities will be necessary as well.
Pursuing these policies does not mean that qualified non-minority
officers need be denied deserved assignments or promotions. But it
does mean that the military should re-examine whether the existing
qualifications really match the actual requirements of positions.
By committing itself to using affirmative action more
comprehensively, the military can banish lingering doubts about
whether it truly offers equal opportunity for all, further burnish its
reputation as a place where diversity works, and maintain its hard-won
status as a revered American institution. With the military fully
committed to expanding its use of affirmative action without hesitation,
the military’s past and present success can play an even larger role in
persuading the Supreme Court when the viability of public affirmative
action is next considered. Affirmative action needs the military, but the
military needs affirmative action. Their fates are, indeed, intertwined.

